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ARTICLES
A MODEL FOR DEFUNDING: AN EVIDENCE-BASED
STATUTE FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CRISIS RESPONSE
TaleedEl-Sabawi* & Jennfer J. Carroll**
ABSTRACT

Too many Black persons and other persons of color are dying at the hands of law

enforcement, leadingmany to callfor the defunding ofpolice. These deaths were directly
caused by excessive use offorce by police officers but were also driven by upstream and

institutionalfactors that include structural racism, institutional bias, and a historic
culture of racializedviolence. Public outcry against racial inequities has increased as
the authority of police departments has expanded to include not only the authority to
respond to and investigate criminal activity but also to respond to calls regarding
behavioral health issues and houselessness. Defunding police raises questions about
how budget cuts should affect the types of services provided by police departments and
what new and improved responses may look like. While advocates may have identified
model programs that they hope will be the answer to defunding the police, many

community organizerslack the legal training necessary to institutionalize their visions
in ways that protect againstlaw enforcement co-option. This Article proposes a model
act (the Model BehavioralHealth Response Team Act) that can be tailored to meet the
needs of local and state policymakers endeavoring to create a new institution to replace
the police in responding to mental health, substance use, and housing crises. The
institution created by this model act is evidence based, person centered, and community

driven. It is informed by empirical evidence on crisis response, federalguidelines, and a
case study of political activity resultingfrom the police killing of a Black man amidst a
behavioralhealth crisis in Greensboro, N.C.
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INTRODUCTION

Public demand to divest public funds from the police and reinvest those resources
in broader social services has reached a new apex. These calls to "defund the police" are
about more than calls to balance the budgets between police departments and essential

* Assistant Professor of Law, Elon University School of Law and Scholar, Addiction & Public Policy
Initiative, O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Georgetown Law Center.
*Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Elon University.
This Article and the accompanying model legislation are dedicated to Marcus Deon Smith and his family.
The authors thank Leo Beletsky, Scott Burris, Corey Davis, Victoria Haneman, Jennifer Oliva, Andrea
Armstrong, and Anna Roberts for their feedback on this project. We are thankful for the thoughtful feedback
fromthe distinguished scholars atthe 2021 ClassCrits Workshop and the 2021 AALS Section on Law and Mental
Disability panelists and attendees, including Andrea Armstrong, Anna Roberts, Nina Kohn, and Danielle Hart.
We gratefully acknowledge the tireless work of Marcus Hyde and the Greensboro Homeless Union in their
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services like public health which have seen their budgets steadily decrease. 2 Rather,
they reflect public interest in dismantling institutions that perpetuate racial violence and
reducing the bureaucratic footprint of policing as an institution.4 These calls are demands
to meaningfully address and take action to prevent excessive use of force by law
enforcement officers that results from unnecessary escalation, implicit bias, or the
mismanagement of challenging situations (like behavioral health crises) that require
specialized skill sets that law enforcement officers do not have. Importantly, excessive
police use of force is disproportionately meted out against Black, Indigenous, and
Hispanic persons -a long-standing pattern driven by racism, ethnocentrism,5 and
authoritarianism' structurally embedded within the institutions that govern, employ, and
represent law enforcement. 8

advocacy. Sincerest thank you to our research assistants Madison Guttry, Heather Kindley, Madison Fields,
Katie Levonick, Clancy Phillips, and Jacob Beeson.

1. See Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1781, 1843
(2020) (explaining why calls to defund the police are more thanjust requests forbudget reductions but are instead
greater calls for social reform).
2. See Brenden Beck & Adam Goldstein, Governing ThroughPolice? HousingMarketReliance, Welfare
Retrenchment, andPoliceBudgeting in an Era ofDeclining Crime, 96 SOC. FORCES 1183, 1185 (2018) (finding
that police budgets have grown and social welfare spending has decreased); David U. Himmelstein & Steffie
Woolhandler, Public Health 's Falling Share of US Health Spending, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 56, 56-57 (2016)
("Real (inflation-adjusted) per capita public health expenditures peaked at $281 per capita (2014 dollars) in
2008, falling 9.3% to $255 in 2014 . . . .").
3. This racial violence is perpetuated, in part, through the racial inequalities found in the act of policing
itself, particularly in analyzing the ways that policing institutions engage with the community. See Joe Soss
Vesla Weaver, Police Are Our Government: Politics, Political Science, and the Policing of Race Class
Subjugated Communities, 20 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 565, 565-66 (2017). Many "race-class subjugated
communities' are governed through coercion, containment, repression, surveillance, regulation, predation,
discipline, and violence." Id. at 565.

4. See Simone Weichselbaum & Nicole Lewis, SupportforDefunding the Police DepartmentIs Growing.
Here's Why It's Not a Silver Bullet, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 9, 2020, 6:00 AM),
http://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/06/09/support-for-defunding-the-police-department-is-growing-here-s
-why-it-s-not-a-silver-bullet [http://perma.cc/E2GX-HA2M] ("Across the country, organizers, celebrities, and
former city officials are calling on lawmakers to reimagine the role of police in public safety.").
5. See Andrea M. Headley & James E. Wright II, Is RepresentationEnough? RacialDisparitiesin Levels
ofForce andArrests by Police, 80 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 1051, 1051-52 (2020) (finding that both Black and white
officers are less likely to use force against white persons); James E. Wright II & Andrea M. Headley, Police Use
of Force Interactions: Is Race Relevant or Gender Germane?, 50 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 851, 851 (2020)
("Findings suggest that there are heightened levels of force used when there is racial and gender incongruenc
[sic] between the officer and the civilian, particularly White officers interacting with Black civilians.").
6.

See Soss & Weaver, supra note 3, at 565-67.

7.

Racial inequities are embedded into the policing institutions in how they hire officers, promote officers,

and deal with complaints against officers. See, e.g., Andrea M. Headley, Race, Ethnicity and Social Equity in
Policing, in ACHIEVING SOCIAL EQUITY: FROM PROBLEMS TO SOLUTIONS 82, 82-91 (Mary E. Guy & Sean A.

McCandless eds., 2020).
8. Police unions are not only involved in negotiating employment contracts for officers but are also active
in the political process, in pursuing litigation in the interest of their members, and in contributing to the media
discourse. See Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 744 (2017).
Police unions have blocked important reforms addressing police misconduct by negotiating great protections for
their officers within their employment contracts. See Stephen Rushin & Allison Garnett, State Labor Law and
FederalPolice Reform, 51 GA. L. REV. 1209, 1211, 1223-25 (2017) (explaining how collective bargaining
agreements with police unions and its union members make reform more difficult); Stephen Rushin & Atticus
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This Article presents a model law to establish a nonpolice response for mental
health or substance use related crises ("behavioral health crises") as a starting point for
incrementally divesting policing agencies of their responsibilities. Such divestments
would decrease their bureaucratic reach, their interactions with communities of color,
and, eventually, their funding. Though it is by no means the only place to begin
divestment, this Article and model law focus on behavioral health concerns because,
although they do not make up a large percentage of police calls for service, they have
been historically 9 and increasingly answered by law enforcement 10 and represent a
disproportionate number of fatal police encounters." The model law proposed in this
Article is designed to reduce the number of police encounters with persons experiencing
behavioral health crises by diverting emergency calls away from law enforcement to
personnel equipped to respond in a humane and evidence-based way. The model law
embodies an incremental approach to policy change that can be repurposed to reassign
other police responsibilities (and public funding for fulfilling those responsibilities) to
more appropriate service providers, one social issue or public service domain at a time.
While legal scholars have not, to date, explicitly rejected the premises or policy
agendas of the Defund the Police movement, some scholars have voiced criticism against
decreasing police budgets, arguing that police agencies are already underfunded 3 and
that further divestment will drive up violent crime rates." Other scholars propose more
conservative reforms in lieu of defunding that would support better functioning of police

DeProspo, Interrogating Police Officers, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646, 650, 657 (2019) (explaining how
collective bargaining agreements with police unions and their members have hindered the ability to effectively
interrogate police officers when issues of police misconduct arise, substantially impacting reform). Police unions
have also generated solidarity for the police community, supporting the so-called Blue Lives Matter movement
and pitting it as diametrically opposed to the Black Lives Matter movement. See Mark P. Thomas & Steven
Tufts, Blue Solidarity: Police Unions, Race andAuthoritarianPopulism in North America, 34 WORK EMPLOY.
Soc. 126, 134-37 (2020) (arguing that police union support and creation of the solidarity behind Blue Lives
Matter contribute to demonization of the Black Lives Matter movement as a criminal enterprise and subsequently
interfere with efforts of police reform); Frank Rudy Cooper, Cop Fragility and Blue Lives Matter, 2020 UNIV.
ILL. L. REV. 621, 626 (2020) ("Unfortunately, Blue Lives Matter advocates sometimes strike a hysterical tone in
their denial that the police should reform. That makes it difficult for them to adopt effective reforms that can
heal their relations with racial minority communities.").
9. See Amy C. Watson & Anjali J. Fulambarker, The CrisisIntervention Team Model ofPolice Response
to Mental Health Crises: A Primerfor Mental Health Practitioners, 8 BEST PRAC. MENTAL HEALTH 71, 72
(2012); Randolph Dupont & Sam Cochran, Police Response to Mental Health Emergencies Barriers to
Change, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 338, 338-44 (2000).
10. See Jennifer J. Carroll, Sasha Mital, Jessica Wolff, Rita K. Noonan, Pedro Martinez, Melissa C.
Podolsky, John C. Killorin & Traci C. Green, Knowledge, Preparedness, and Compassion FatigueAmong Law
Enforcement Officers Who Respond to OpioidOverdose, 217 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 1, 1-2 (2020).
11.

DORIS A. FULLER, H. RICHARD LAMB, MICHAEL BIASOTTI

& JOHN SNOOK,

TREATMENT ADVOC.

CTR., OVERLOOKED IN THE UNDERCOUNTED: THE ROLE OF MENTAL ILLNESS IN FATAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
ENCOUNTERS

1

(2015),

http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/overlooked-in-the-undercounted.pdf
[http://perma.cc/MX23-YD3W].
12. See Michael Mintrom & Phillipa Norman, Policy Entrepreneurshipand Policy Change, 37 POLY
STUD. J. 649, 654-55 (2009).
13.

See Stephen Rushin & Roger Michalski, Police Funding, 72 FLA. L. REV. 277, 302, 319-20 (2020).

14. Paul G. Cassell, Explainingthe Recent HomicideSpikes in U.S. Cities: The "MinneapolisEffect" and
the Decline in ProactivePolicing, 33 FED. SENT'G REP. 83, 84 (2020).
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forces in their current state. Such reforms include increased community oversight of
police15 or restructuring the law to make it easier for police misconduct to be addressed. 16
The structural critiques existing in legal scholarship have largely acknowledged that the
law permits racialized police violence and that this violence contributes to societal
inequities, economic inequalities, and disproportionate power dynamics.17 Yet, the more
"persistent" legal framework for police reform argues that the institution of policing is
socially desirable and essential in ensuring public safety and public order. 18
However, these alternative proposals do not sufficiently address the root problems
driving racist and excessive police use of force: the disproportionate social and political
power wielded by police agencies and the deeply ingrained racial biases 19 and permissive
cultures 20 that are inextricably woven into the processes and procedures of policing

15. See Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, ConstitutionalInterpretation Without Judges: Police
Violence, Excessive Force, andRemaking the Fourth Amendment, 105 VA. L. REv. 425, 447 (2019) (proposing
that private citizens should work in tandem with the police in crafting policing standards); Anthony O'Rourke,
Rick Su & Guyora Binder, DisbandingPolice Agencies, 121 COLUM. L. REv. 1327, 1351-52 (2021) (arguing
that police agencies should be reformed into more democratic institutions with public oversight).
16. See Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force: De-Escalation, Preseizure
Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 629, 688 (2018) (arguing for the restructuring
laws to limit the veil protection of an officer's "reasonable belief" in discharging a firearm and so as to not allow
"force defense" to be raised as limitlessly); Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructingthe RightAgainstExcessive Force,
68 FLA. L. REV. 1773, 1814 (2016) (proposing that qualified immunity in the context of excessive force claims
should be governed under the Fourteenth Amendment's general principles to allow courts to more readily
provide equitable relief where it facially is ripe); Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Endogenous
Fourth Amendment: An EmpiricalAssessment of How Police Understandings of Excessive Force Become

ConstitutionalLaw, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1281, 1318 (2019) (arguing the ambiguities in Fourth Amendment
doctrine allow police to define what is reasonable in the context of excessive force usage and only by changing
this endogenous structure can we promote a model of policing where community stakeholders play an active
role in policing and accountability); Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, State Attorneys General as Agents of
Police Reform, 69 DUKE L.J. 999, 1000 (2020) (suggesting state attorneys general should be granted explicit
statutory authority to seek equitable relief against local police departments); Seth W. Stoughton, How the Fourth
Amendment Frustratesthe Regulation ofPolice Violence, 70 EMORY L.J. 521, 583 (2021) (recommending that
state and local officials disentangle state and administrative law from Fourth Amendment doctrine). Some of
these works even acknowledge the need to account for the structural drivers of police violence and disparate
impact on Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC). See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black
People to Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathwaysto Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. R'EV. 125,
129 (2017) (examining how racial profiling, permitted by the Fourth Amendment, increases the likelihood that
Black persons will encounter deadly use of force by police officers).
17. Professor Akbar summarizes this literature as being grounded in arguments for (1) more democratic
governance and oversight over policing agencies; (2) greater technocratic inputs into the creation of
administrative processes that would better standardize police behavior in ways that align with evidence-based
policing; (3) more procedural justice, which reinforces legitimacy and trust in policing agencies leading to
greater public compliance; and (4) emphasis on more tools and technologies to assist law enforcement in
performing their duties in more equitable ways. Akbar, supra note 1, at 1803.

18. Id. at 1802.
19. See Kristin Henning, Boys to Men: The Role of Policing in the Socialization of Black Boys, in
POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT 57, 58 (Angela J. Davis ed., 2017).

20. See Reade Levinson, Across the US., Police ContractsShield Officersfrom Scrutiny andDiscipline,
REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2017, 1:18 PM), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-unions/
[http://perma.cc/M83J-KY68]; Legal Barriers To Challenging Excessive Force by Police, EQUAL JUST.
INITIATIVE
(May 18, 2020), http://eji.org/news/legal-barriers-to-challenging-excessive-force-by-police/
[http://perma.cc/F9TR-CN5U].
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today. By supporting reforms that maintain the structural status quo (including the
problematically broad scope of police responsibilities today), the legal academy
relegitimizes policing as an institution and sanctions the atrocities that continue to be
conducted at the hands of that institution.
There is a desperate need for strategic reconsideration of the scope of duties
assigned to law enforcement. Indeed, legal reforms that seek to alleviate concerns about
police use of force through additional training of police officers or oversight of police
agencies fail to acknowledge that the range of responsibilities assumed by law
enforcement has far exceeded their central organizational purpose of ensuring public
safety through the enforcement of the law. Law enforcement has become the proverbial
"first responder" as their responsibilities swelled to "fill the gap" in America's disjointed
and, at times, nonexistent systems for healthcare and human services. This leaves law
enforcement stretched problematically thin, tasks them with rendering services that
officers are not trained to provide, and often places the provision of those essential
services in conflict with law enforcement's primary mission to ensure the public's safety.
We, the authors, are not alone in noticing the moral and practical shortcomings of
responses in opposition to defunding the police." Of late, more and more legal scholars
are writing in support of defunding the police as a viable policy proposal.2 2 These
scholars recognize the folly of using existing legal and institutional structures to address
the racism and power dynamics embedded in those systems, as evidenced by the extreme
disparity in over-policing and excessive police use of force in American communities. 23
Importantly, many have called for the divestment of public funds from law enforcement
agencies while advocating for the development of nonpolice institutions to which
responsibilities currently held by law enforcement may be transferred.24 Most notably,
Professor Amna A. Akbar has directly confronted those who have dismissed calls to
defund the police, elucidating the depth of structural policy reforms contained within
those calls" and challenging legal scholars to "understand how organizers are using law
as a tool." 26
We heed Professor Akbar's call. This Article draws on interviews conducted with
advocates across the country-as well as our own work assisting organizers in drafting
municipal and county ordinances in order to explain how law can be used to

21. See generallyAkbar, supranote 1; Amna A. Akbar, Toward aRadicalImaginationofLaw, 93 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 405 (2018); Amna A. Akbar, Demandsfor a DemocraticPoliticalEconomy, 134 HARv. L. REV. F. 90
(2020); Amna A. Akbar, Sameer M. Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson, Movement Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 821 (2021).
22. See generally Akbar, supra note 1; O'Rourke et al., supra note 15; V. Noah Gimbel & Craig
Muhammad, Are Police Obsolete?Breaking Cycles ofViolence Through Abolition Democracy, 40 CARDozo L.
REV. 1453 (2019); Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778 (2021);
Michelle S. Jacobs, The Violent State: Black Women's Invisible Struggle Against Police Violence, 24 WM.
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 39 (2017); ANDREA J. RITCHIE, INVISIBLE NO MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK

WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR (2017); K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson, The Institutional Design of
Community Control, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 679 (2020); Jordan Blair Woods, Traffic Without the Police, 73 STAN.
L. REV. 1471 (2021) (proposing a new system of traffic enforcement divorced from policing agencies).
23.

See generallyAkbar, supra note 1.

24.

See Akbar, supra note 1, at 1830; Gimbel & Muhammad, supra note 22, at 1465.

25.

Akbar, supra note 1, at 1783.

26.

Id. at 1845.
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incrementally reallocate responsibilities from police agencies to other government
agencies or service providers.
In addition to providing a model for a nonpolice behavioral health crisis response,
this Article provides guidance to advocates interested in implementing the model law for
navigating political roadblocks, particularly those presented by a politically conservative
electorate. 27 Further, the Article predicts and addresses through policy
design implementation issues that could arise in efforts to incrementally divest police
of responsibilities. The Article provides empirical evidence and political strategy needed
to sway both liberal and conservative lawmakers to gradually dismantle policing
agencies by reassigning responsibilities to nonpolice institutions. It further adds to the
emerging legal scholarship on divestment from law enforcement infrastructures by
drawing attention to an important justification for defunding the police one that has yet
to be highlighted in the recent legal scholarship: the routine excessive use of force by
law enforcement officers against persons with behavioral health concerns. Indeed, many
of these persons are members of the same populations disproportionately subjected to
excessive use of force by police because of their race or ethnicity. 28
In so doing, the Article addresses necessary bureaucratic concerns about the
division of powers between state, county, and municipal governments that will likely
arise when proposing policy reforms seeking to reassign responsibilities from one
administrative agency (i.e., law enforcement) to another. The Article reviews the costs
and benefits of assigning such responsibilities to a private versus public organization and
discusses the implications for the creation of institutions needed to justify the defunding
of police.
Perhaps this Article's most significant contribution to the legal scholarship on
methods for defunding the police is the model law accompanying it, along with political,
practical, and legal justifications for the inclusion of each provision. This model
statute the Behavioral Health Response Team (BHRT) Act, attached in Appendix
A-offers alternative language to render it suitable for enactment at the municipal,
county, or state level and may thereby be customized to fit the needs of various
communities seeking methods for the incremental dismantling of their own police
institutions. The provisions in the model statute were designed according to several
considerations: feedback received from community leaders and members of
underrepresented groups in North Carolina; legal considerations encountered in assisting
groups advocating for the incremental dismantling of police; our own expertise in mental
health and addiction policy history and evidence-based behavioral health treatment; the
political process; current understandings of mechanisms of interest group mobilization
and policy change; and comments received by national experts in policing, mental health,
and addiction policy.
This Article proceeds as follows. Section I describes the empirical literature
demonstrating the scope of the problem the model statute seeks to address, focusing on
excessive police use of force, race and racism, behavioral health concerns, and how lack
of adequate housing increases the risks of victimization. Section II critiques a particular
strategy for police reform under the status quo that has not received much attention or

27.

See infra Part JV.G.

28.

See infra Section I.
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criticism in the legal scholarship: additional training and support for the continuation of
police response to behavioral health crises in the form of crisis intervention teams (CIT)
and law-enforcement-led co-responder teams.
National advocates for CIT and co-responder programs do not question whether
law enforcement officers should be responding to behavioral health emergencies; rather,
they accept that law enforcement officers will be responding to these calls for service
and seek to alter how officers carry out their response. 29 This Article refutes the claim
that CIT and co-responder models present a reasonable alternative to police divestment.
It further equips policymakers with empirical evidence that demonstrates that these
strategies are not only ineffective in decreasing excessive use of force against persons
experiencing behavioral health emergencies but also are serving to effectively
relegitimize the policing institution as it currently exists.
Section III discusses the case study of Greensboro, North Carolina, presenting the
policy proposals adopted and political hurdles faced by advocacy groups in their efforts
to defund the local police. Section III offers suggestions for how advocates can overcome
these barriers, particularly when proposing incremental police reform efforts in
conservative states. Section IV provides specific policy recommendations and a detailed
explanation of the provisions of the model statute that may be customized for use by
either state or local governments wishing to adopt the recommendations in this Article.
I. THE PROBLEMS POSED BY POLICE RESPONSE TO BEHAVIORAL HEALTH EMERGENCIES

The harms caused by law enforcement's use of force are wide and varied. This
Section is not meant to be a systematic review of the literature on police use of force or
the harms that result from such encounters. Instead, it is meant to describe the scope of
the problem, as well as highlight some of the difficulties that researchers encounter in
their efforts to document the amount of harm caused by the excessive use of force by
police.
A.

Law Enforcement Use of Force Against Black Personsand Other Personsof

Color
"Use of force"3 0 by law enforcement officers is a significant public health problem
that disproportionately affects Black, Indigenous, and Hispanic persons. Black men and

29.

See

Crisis

Intervention

Team

(CIT)

Programs,

NAMI,

http://nami.org/Advocacy/Crisis-Intervention/Crisis-Intervention-Team-(CIT)-Programs
[http://perma.cc/GQ5R-8LZ5] (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) ("The lack of mental health crisis services across the
U.S. has resulted in law enforcement officers serving as first responders to most crises. A Crisis Intervention
Team (CIT) program is an innovative, community-based approach to improve the outcomes of these
encounters.").
30. "Use of force" is a term generally used to describe those actions taken by a law enforcement officer
in order to mitigate an incident, make an arrest, or protect themselves or others from harm. Overview ofPolice
Use of Force, NAT'L INST. JUST. (Mar. 5, 2020), http://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/overview-police-use-force
[http://perma.cc/A34W-XE2Y]. Most often, use of force is engaged for purposes of coercion and control of a
situation, as is reflected in the definition of this term endorsed by the Bureau of Justice Statistics: "The amount
of effort required by law enforcement to gain compliance from an unwilling subject." Use of Force, BUREAU
JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfmty=tp&tid=84 [http://perma.cc/RR8W-QASY] (last visited Nov. 1,
2021).
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women, American Indian/Alaskan Native men and women, and Hispanic men are all
more likely to be killed by law enforcement than their white peers. 31 Death by a firearm
discharged during a law enforcement intervention was among the top twenty most
common causes of injury death from 2000 to 2018 in American Indian, Alaskan Native,
and Hispanic males aged fifteen to thirty-four years.3 2 In the same time period, it was the
tenth most common cause of injury death among Black individuals of both sexes aged
fifteen to twenty-four years. 33 An evaluation of 2,285 instances of death resulting from
law enforcement intervention between 2010 and 2014 found that Hispanic and
non-Hispanic Black individuals were, respectively, 1.7 and 2.8 times more likely to die
as a consequence of law enforcement use of force compared to their white counterparts. 34
Should the incidence of law enforcement use of force continue at current rates, about one
out of every one thousand Black men alive as of the writing of this Article will ultimately
be killed by law enforcement use of force. 35 Collectively, this data indicates a widespread
pattern of law enforcement use of force that is disproportionately applied more
frequently, escalated more quickly, and results in more severe injury and death among
Black, Indigenous, and Hispanic populations.
B.

Law Enforcement Use of Force Against Individuals with BehavioralHealth
Concerns

Black, Indigenous, and Hispanic persons who experience behavioral health crises
are at an even greater risk of being subjected to excessive use of force at the hands of
law enforcement. Though no nationally representative datasets exist, current estimates
suggest that approximately 1% of all law enforcement dispatches and encounters involve
an individual living with one or more mental disorders, excluding substance use. 3 6 For
reference, the City of Baltimore, Maryland, reported more than 1.4 million calls for
service in 2019, which, according to the 1% estimate, likely represents an average of
1,200 interactions between police and individuals living with mental disorders every
month. 37 Further, in a nationwide survey of 2,207 senior law enforcement officials

31. Frank Edwards, Michael H. Esposito & Hedwig Lee, Risk ofPolice-InvolvedDeath by Race/Ethnicity
and Place, UnitedStates, 2012 2018, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1241, 1241 (2018) ("Black men's mortality risk
is between 1.9 and 2.4 deaths per 100,000 per year, Latino risk is between 0.8 and 1.2, and White risk is between
0.6 and 0.7.").
32. See
WISQARS:
Leading
Causes
of
Death
Reports,
1981-2019,
CDC,
http://wisqars.cdc.gov/fatal-leading [http://perma.cc/PE85-XDU6] (last updated Feb. 20, 2020). To identify
these trends, we queried WISQARs three times. Each time, we asked the system to return tables for the period
2000-2018 (most recent data available at time of writing), to show data for all injuries, to return the top twenty
causes of death, and to display age groups as every ten years for ages fifteen to sixty-five and older. To generate
the statistics we reference, we ran one query for Black individuals of any sex, one for American Indian/Alaskan
Native males, and one for Hispanic males.
33.

See id.

34.

James W. Buehler, Racial/Ethnic Disparitiesin the Use of Lethal Force by US Police, 2010 2014,

107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 295, 295-96 (2017).
35.

See Edwards et al., supra note 31, at 1243.

36.

James D. Livingston, Contact Between Police andPeople with Mental Disorders:AReview ofRates,

67 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 850, 852 (2016).
37. 911
Calls
for
Service
2019,
http://data.baltimorecity.gov/datasets/baltimore::911-calls-for-service-2019/about
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conducted in 2011, 81% of respondents reported an increase in the population of people
living with mental disorders in their jurisdictions over the length of their careers; 63% of
respondents reported a moderate increase in the amount of time on calls for service
involving individuals living with mental disorders; and an additional 18% reported a
substantial, or larger than moderate, increase in time spent on these calls.38
The public health burden that results from law enforcement interaction and police
use of force against individuals with mental or behavioral health concerns can be
evaluated in several ways. One method is to assess the prevalence of law enforcement
encounters among individuals in this population. An early study sampled 172 people
living with schizophrenia or a schizoaffective disorder between 1989 and 1991.39 Each
participant was followed for a period of three years. 4 0 Researchers who conducted this
study noted that these individuals were fourteen times more likely to be victims of a
violent crime than to be arrested for allegedly committing one; nevertheless, 48% of
participants experienced contact with the police during the study period. 1 A 2012 study
examined the nature of police encounters among a population of individuals living with
schizophrenia or a related psychosis who were receiving public mental health services.4 2
Over a ten-year period, the majority (65%) of individuals who experienced arrest were
detained in connection to crimes against public order,4 3 suggesting that most of the
concerns that law enforcement was dispatched for involved symptoms and sequelae of
mental illness not straightforwardly criminogenic behavior.4 4
Another method for assessing the public health burden of law enforcement
interaction with this population is to consider the proportion of injuries resulting from
law enforcement intervention sustained by individuals living with mental and behavioral
health disorders. An analysis of statewide hospital-discharge data from the State of
Illinois for the years 2000-2009 compared 836 individuals treated for injuries sustained
during law enforcement intervention with a group of individuals that received treatment
for non-law-enforcement-related injuries.4 5 The two comparison groups were matched

[http://perma.cc/4SGB-M483] (last visited Nov. 1, 2021). Data published to this website indicate that there were
1,455,168 calls for service in Baltimore in 2019. That number divided by twelve is about 120,000 calls per
month, and 1% of 120,000 is 1,200.
38. See Michael C. Biasotti, Management of the Severely Mentally Ill and Its Effects on Homeland
Security 43 (Sept. 2011) (unpublished Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School) (on file with Dudley Knox
Library).
39. John S. Brekke, Cathy Prindle, Sung Woo Bae & Jeffrey D. Long, Risks for Individuals with
Schizophrenia Who Are Living in the Community, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1358, 1358 (2001).
40.

Id.

41.

Id. at 1362, 1365.

42. Patrick J. McCabe, Paul P. Christopher, Nicholas Druhn, Kristen M. Roy-Bujnowski, Albert J.
Grudzinskas Jr. & William H. Fisher, Arrest Types and Co-OccurringDisordersin Personswith Schizophrenia
or Related Psychoses, 39 J. BEHAv. HEALTH SERVS. & RSCH. 271, 271 (2012).
43. Id. Crimes against public order are defined differently across jurisdictions, but most frequently
encompass drug- and alcohol-related crimes, commercial sex work, public drunkenness, and disorderly conduct.
Jessica Tmn, Crimes Against Public Order, LEGAL MATCH (Nov. 4, 2021), http://www.legalmatch.com/lawlibrary/article/crimes-against-public-order.html [http://perma.cc/6W88-VQRY].
44.

See McCabe et al., supra note 42, at 271-72.

45. Alfreda Holloway-Beth, Linda Forst, Julia Lippert, Sherry Brandt-Rauf, Sally Freels & Lee
Friedman, Risk FactorsAssociated with Legal Interventions, 3 INJ. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1, 3-4 (2016).
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by eight characteristics, including age, race, gender, and date of admission.4 6 The
analysis found that individuals treated for injuries sustained during law enforcement
intervention were 1.4 times more likely than the reference group to be living with alcohol
use disorder, 1.8 times more likely to be living with another kind of substance use
disorder, 2.4 times more likely to be living with depression, 2.8 times more likely to be
living with a paralytic condition, and 8.6 times more likely to be living with
schizophrenia.4 7 A similar cross-sectional study that incorporated data from a
representative sample of the general population in four U.S. cities found that the
occurrence of a psychotic episode was associated with experiencing a police encounter
and that this relationship displayed a dose-response effect, meaning that a higher number
of psychotic episodes experienced by an individual predicted a higher number of police
encounters.4 8
In sum, research indicates that the burden of law enforcement interactions and
related injuries is disproportionately experienced across populations affected by a
spectrum of mental and behavioral health concerns. Further, that burden appears to
increase at the individual level as the severity of those behavioral health concerns
increases. These findings, in combination with research showing markedly high levels
of stigma against mental illness among law enforcement officers,4 9 suggest that
disproportionate law enforcement interaction and use of force with individuals living
with mental and behavioral disorders is a de facto professional norm in law enforcement
that is scaffolded by a complex set of structural, cultural, interpersonal, and individual
drivers.
II. LAw ENFORCEMENT PARTNERSHIPS AND POLICE REFORM
A.

CrisisIntervention Teams and Co-ResponderModels

Interdisciplinary partnerships between law enforcement agencies and specialists
working in other human service or healthcare professions have been widely proposed
and implemented as collaborative solutions to local problems, such as the opioid

46.

Id.

47.

Id. at 4, 6.

48. Jordan E. DeVylder, Courtney Cogburn, Hans Y. Oh, Deidre Anglin, Melissa Edmondson Smith,
Tanya Sharpe, Hyun-Jin Jun, Jason Schiffman, Ellen Lukens & Bruce Link, Psychotic Experiences in the
Context of Police Victimization: Datafrom the Survey ofPolice Public Encounters, 43 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL.
993, 995-97 (2017).
49. See Heather Stuart, Mental Illness Stigma Expressed by Police to Police, 54 ISR. J. PSYCHIATRY
RELATED SCI. 18, 21-22 (2017) (showing that most officers who participated in the study believed that officers
"would not seek professional help for a mental illness and would consider treatment as a sign of personal
failure").
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overdose epidemic, 50 mental health crises," and even chronic truancy. 52 One of the most
prolific programs intended to improve the quality of law enforcement responses to
behavioral-health-related calls for service is the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) model,
which has already been implemented in nearly 3,000 law enforcement agencies across
the United States.5 3 Recent years have also seen an increase in enthusiasm for
co-responder models, in which law enforcement officers respond to crisis calls in tandem
with nonpolice partners, such as mental health or substance use professionals.54 We
discuss these police-centered strategies in turn below.
The CIT model was developed in Memphis, Tennessee, following the shooting
death of twenty-seven-year-old Joseph Dewayne Robinson at the hands of the Memphis
police.55 On September 24, 1987, Robinson's mother called 911 to report that her
son who reportedly had lived experience of chronic mental illness and substance
use was in the area just outside of their home, allegedly cutting himself with a knife
and verbally threatening others. 56 According to the reports made by the four police
officers dispatched, Mr. Robinson was stabbing himself in the neck with a butcher's knife
when they arrived. 57 The officers claim Mr. Robinson lunged at them as they approached,
after which the officers fired on Mr. Robinson no less than ten times. 58 Following public
outcry over the shooting, the Memphis chapter of the National Alliance on Mental Illness
facilitated discussions between law enforcement and the wider community, and the
eponymous "Memphis model" for CIT was subsequently launched in 1988.59 Since then,
CIT (or some variation of it) has been rapidly adopted and is now widespread across the

50. See generally Scott W. Formica, Robert Apsler, Lindsay Wilkins, Sarah Ruiz, Brittni Reilly
Alexander Y. Walley, Post Opioid Overdose Outreach by Public Health and Public Safety
Agencies: Exploration of Emerging Programs in Massachusetts, 54 INT'L J. DRUG POLY 43 (2018)
(summarizing findings from interdisciplinary programs in Massachusetts).
51. See National Model, UNIV. MEM. CIT CTR., http://www.cit.memphis.edu/overview.php?page=7
[http://perma.cc/SW76-8XRF] (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
52. See, e.g., Lorraine Mazerolle, Emma Antrobus, Sarah Bennett & Elizabeth Eggins, Reducing Truancy
and Fosteringa Willingness To Attend School: Results from aRandomized Trial ofa Police-SchoolPartnership
Program, 18 PREVENTION SC. 469, 469 (2017) (evaluating police-school partnership programs).
53.

See UNIV. MEM. CIT CTR., supra note 51.

54.

See ASHLEY KRIDER & REGINA HUERTER, POLY RSCH., INC., KIRBY GAHERTY & ANDREW MOORE,
NAT'L LEAGUE OF CITIES, RESPONDING TO INDIVIDUALS IN BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CRISIS VIA CO-RESPONDER
MODELS:

THE

ROLES

OF

CITIES,

COUNTIES,

LAW

ENFORCEMENT,

AND

PROVIDERS

1

(2020),

http://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/SJCResponding%/`20to%/`20Individuals.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8QSS-6CWC].
55. Daniel Connolly, Memphis Police CrisisIntervention Team Approaches 30 Years, but How Effective
Is
It?,
COM.
APPEAL
(Aug.
6,
2017,
6:00
AM),
http://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/crime/2017/08/06/memphis-police-mental-health-crisis-team-3
0-years/493740001/ [http://perma.cc/XTT6-4XSJ] (reporting on the events that led to the creation of the
Memphis CIT).
56. Michael S. Rogers, Dale E. McNiel & Rende L. Binder, Effectiveness of Police CrisisIntervention
TrainingPrograms,47 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 414, 415 (2019).
57.

See id.

58.

Charles L. Scott, JailDiversion:A PracticalPrimer,in DECRIMINALIZING MENTAL ILLNESS 106, 107

(Kathrine

Warburton
&
Stephen
M.
Stahl
eds.,
2021),
http://services.camibridge.org/us/academic/subjects/medicine/mental-health-psychiatry-and-clinical-psycholog
y/decriminalizing-mental-illness?format=PB&isbn=9781108826952 [http://perma.cc/JZU8-DDUX].
59.

Rogers et al., supra note 56, at 415-17.
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United States. For illustration, by the time the first scholarly manuscript fully describing
a generalized programmatic framework for CIT emerged in the peer-reviewed literature
in 2008, CIT programs were already in operation at an estimated 400 U.S. law
enforcement agencies. 60 By 2019, the CIT Center at the University of Memphis boasted
a roster of more than 2,700 CIT programs across the United States. 61
The core components of the CIT model, as defined by the CIT Center at the
University of Memphis, include (1) a forty-hour comprehensive training for officers
wishing to participate in the program; (2) the establishment of a fully staffed CIT
leadership team (consisting of trained CIT law enforcement officers, trained dispatch
personnel, a CIT law enforcement coordinator, a mental health coordinator, an advocacy
coordinator, and a multijurisdictional program coordinator); and (3) an established
partnership with a specialized mental health emergency care facility capable of receiving
referrals from the CIT program.62 Officer training the backbone of the CIT
model generally includes education about mental illness, the causes, signs, and
symptoms of mental illness, and information on involuntary commitment criteria,
communication skills, and de-escalation strategies. 63
Despite the enormous number of programs in operation in the thirty years following
CIT's conception, little evidence exists to show that the CIT approach is effective at
reducing incidents of police use of force (or even simply reducing incidents of excessive
police use of force) during behavioral-health-related calls. 64 One challenge in assessing
the efficacy of the CIT approach is that the stated goals of CIT programs vary from place
to place: some communities employ the model to improve community safety, others to
enhance officer safety, still others to facilitate linkage to care and diversion from booking
and jail.65 This variation in implementation priorities makes it difficult if not practically
impossible to conduct rigorous, controlled trials to test the effects of CIT programs. 66
Further, the task of evaluating the public health impacts of CIT efforts is far from
straightforward.67 Such an evaluation exercise would require a substantial deviation from
(or addition to) the data collection and evaluation activities in which law enforcement
agencies already engage. 68 The data collected at current is often limited to variables not

60. Amy C. Watson, Melissa Schaefer Morabito, Jeffrey Draine & Victor Ottati, Improving Police
Response to Persons with Mental Illness: A Multi-Level Conceptualization of CIT, 31 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY
359, 361 (2008) [hereinafter Watson et al., Improving Police Response].
61.

Rogers et al., supra note 56, at 417; UNIV. MEM. CIT CTR., supra note 51.

62.

See RANDOLPH DUPONT, SAM COCHRAN & SARAH PILLSBURY, CRISIS INTERVENTION TEAM CORE

ELEMENTS 4 (2007).

63.

Watson et al., Improving Police Response, supra note 60, at 363.

64. Eddie Kane, Emily Evans & Farhad Shokraneh, Effectiveness of CurrentPolicing-Related Mental
Health Interventions: A Systematic Review, 28 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 108, 108 (2018)
(systematically reviewing studies on policing-related mental health interventions).
65.

Michael T. Compton, Masuma Bahora, Amy C. Watson & Janet R. Oliva, A Comprehensive Review

of Extant Research on Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Programs, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 47, 53

(2008) [hereinafter Compton et al., Comprehensive Review].
66.

Kane et al., supra note 64.

67.

See Watson et al., Improving Police Response, supra note 60, at 359-60.

68.

See id. at 360.
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directly impacted by behavioral health responses such as arrest rates, crime statistics, and
response times. 69
As a result, the vast majority of research on CIT programs has been limited to the
evaluation of officer-level outcomes, including law enforcement officers' abilities to
identify someone living with a mental illness and officers' reported confidence in
responding to calls involving an individual with a mental illness. 70 Indeed, there is ample
evidence that CIT training is effective in increasing officer knowledge and confidence.? 1
In rare cases, studies have gone further and assessed officers' perceptions of possible
scenarios in the field, but those scenarios are, by definition, hypothetical and a better
reflection of officer knowledge than they are of officer behavior or actual use of force. 72
Today, the evidence base for CIT still lacks meaningful assessments of the events that
unfold in the field as law enforcement officers respond to CIT-related calls for service. 73
Likewise, no satisfactory evidence exists that would support the assertion that changes
in an individual officer's knowledge or confidence as a result of CIT training are
associated with measurable changes in call dispositions or patterns of police use of force
in the field."4 In other words, though ample research exists to demonstrate that individual
law enforcement officers gain a great deal personally from CIT training, whether their
behaviors on the job subsequently change due to that personal growth is largely
unknown. 75
At current, the evidence that behavioral health response training including but not
limited to CIT approaches fundamentally changes officer behavior in the field is not
strong. A 2017 study that evaluated more than 2,000 officer reports spanning more than
five years of police activity in a single county in Michigan found that the disposition of
a call for service (i.e., whether someone was arrested, transported, etc.) was predicted
not by officer training but by how the call was dispatched. 76 Specifically, CIT calls that
were dispatched as "mental disturbance" were significantly more likely to result in a
subject being transported to a mental health facility than CIT calls dispatched as "citizen

69.

See id. at 362.

70. Compton et al., Comprehensive Review, supra note 65, at 49; Watson et al., Improving Police
Response, supra note 60, at 362.
71. Marisa D. Booty, Rebecca G. Williams & Cassandra K. Crifasi, Evaluation of a CrisisIntervention
Team Pilot Program:Results from Baltimore, MD, 56 CMTY. MENTAL HEALTH J. 251, 253-55 (2020); Kelli E.
Canada, Beth Angell & Amy C. Watson, Intervening at the Entry Point: Differences in How CIT Trained and
Non-CIT TrainedOfficers DescribeResponding to Mental Health-RelatedCalls, 48 CMTY. MENTAL HEALTH J.
746, 748 (2012).
72. See Michael T. Compton, Berivan N. Demir Neubert, Beth Broussard, Joanne A. McGriff, Rhiannon
Morgan & Janet R. Oliva, Use of Force Preferences and Perceived Effectiveness of Actions Among Crisis
Intervention Team (CIT) Police Officers and Non-CIT Officers in an EscalatingPsychiatricCrisisInvolving a
Subject with Schizophrenia, 37 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 737, 737 (2011) [hereinafter Compton, Use ofForce].
73.

See Watson et al., Improving Police Response, supra note 60, at 359.

74.

See Compton et al., ComprehensiveReview, supra note 65, at 53.

75. Amy C. Watson, Michael T. Compton & Jeffrey N. Draine, The Crisis Intervention Team (CIT)
Model: An Evidence-Based Policing Practice?, 35 BEHAv. SCis. & L. 431, 438 (2017) [hereinafter Watson et
al., CIT Model]; Amy C. Watson & Michael T. Compton, What Research on CrisisIntervention Teams Tells Us
and What We Need To Ask, 47 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 422, 423-24 (2019).
76. See Christian Ritter, Jennifer L. S. Teller, Kristen Marcussen, Mark R. Munetz & Brent Teasdale,
Crisis Intervention Team Officer Dispatch, Assessment, and Disposition: Interactions with Individuals with
Severe Mental Illness, 34 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 30, 31-32 (2011).
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assist," "disturbance," "suspicious person," or "assault." 7 Further, CIT calls dispatched
as "suspected suicide" were significantly more likely than CIT calls dispatched as
"mental disturbance" to result in transportation to a mental health facility.7 8 Thus, while
CIT programs have been demonstrated to increase transportation to mental health
facilities, 79 there is compelling evidence that those transportation decisions may not be
clinically appropriate. Indeed, it is the first impression of the dispatcher, rather than the
enhanced assessment skills that CIT officers have allegedly gained through behavioral
health crisis identification and response training, that seems to be the primary factor
influencing the choices made by CIT officers on the scene. 80
Research assessing other types of specialized mental or public health response
training for law enforcement officers also suggests that officer training does not directly
influence officer behavior in the field. A recent study conducted across several precincts
within the Chicago Police Department found that a training in transparency and
procedural justice akin to CIT training in its focus on community perspective but
without a behavioral health component produced a mere 10% reduction in citizen
complaints and 6.4% reduction in police use of force incidents. 81 These findings were
significant, but the overall impact of training on officer behavior was extremely modest.
A different study, which surveyed more than 2,800 police officers in twenty states about
their training and experience responding to calls for opioid overdose emergencies, found
that officer training and self-reported attitudes about substance use and public health
responses to the overdose epidemic were not significantly associated with the actions
officers took on calls.8 2 Indeed, the fact that officer deviation from agency protocol is
looked down upon in police culture was considered an explanatory hypothesis for this
finding by this research team. 83 In the words of one co-author of the study who is a career
law enforcement professional, "[police chiefs] don't care what their officers think, they
care what they do."84
Importantly, two studies have identified perverse outcomes of CIT implementation.
One study comparing use of force among officers who had received CIT training versus
those who had not in the Chicago Police Department found no statistically significant

77.

Id. at 30.

78.

Id.

79. Sheryl Kubiak, Erin Comartin, Edita Milanovic, Deborah Bybee, Elizabeth Tillander, Celeste Rabaut,
Heidi Bisson, Lisa M. Dunn, Michael J. Bouchard, Todd Hill & Steven Schneider, Countywide Implementation
of CrisisIntervention Teams: Multiple Methods, Measuresand Sustained Outcomes, 35 BEHAv. SCIS. & L. 456,
459 (2017).
80.

See Ritter et al., supra note 76, at 37.

81.

See Hilary Hurd Anyaso, Police Training Reduced Complaints and Use of ForceAgainst Civilians,
Now
(Apr.
20,
2020),

Nw.

http://news.northwesterm.edu/stories/2020/04/police-training-reduced-complaints-and-use-of-force-against-civi
lians/ [http://perma.cc/QDU5-BTC3].
82.

See Carroll et al., supra note 10, at 3.

83.

Karen Frewin & Keith Tuffin, Police Status, Conformity and Internal Pressure: A Discursive

Analysis ofPolice Culture, 9 DISCOURSE & SOC'Y 173, 173-85 (1998); STEVE MCCARTNEY & RICK PARENT,
ETHICS
IN
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
ch.
8.1
(2015),

http://opentextbc.ca/ethicsinlawenforcement/front-matter/accessibility-statement/
[http://perma.cc/E23J-GPB3].
84.

Personal Communication with Jack Killoran (Sept. 2018).
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difference in the frequency or severity of use of force between these two groups;
however, the CIT officers displayed a marginal increase in use of force over their
non-CIT counterparts. 85 A similar study of all 4,211 use of force incidents documented
between 2008 and 2011 by the Portland Police Bureau (in Portland, Oregon) in which
all sworn officers had received CIT training found that individuals perceived to be
living with a mental or behavioral disorder by the responding officer were more likely to
be subject to use of force and more likely to be perceived by responding officers as
violently resisting. 86
Beyond these isolated instances, however, the overwhelming consensus that has
emerged from systematic reviews of scientific evidence is that insufficient evidence
exists to conclude that CIT programs change officer behavior in the field, alter use of
force patterns, or increase officer or civilian safety during calls for service. 87 Thus, after
more than thirty years of implementation, no local jurisdiction has conclusively
demonstrated that the CIT model consistently reduces the risks faced by people living
with mental and behavioral disorders when interacting with the police.
Co-responder models are a newer trend in policing. Though some co-responder
programs have been around for several decades (such as the twenty-four-hour Crisis Unit
deployed in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, founded in 197388), interest in implementing
and studying such programs has become more widespread in the last decade. 89 These
programs generally consist of dispatching a specially trained team that includes law
enforcement officers in tandem with at least one mental health professional or some other
type of social or behavioral health support specialist to respond to behavioral health
crises. 90 Some programs, as in Chapel Hill, deploy teams including at least one law
enforcement officer to respond to crisis calls. 91 Others dispatch law enforcement as first
responders and subsequently engage non-law enforcement partners to follow up with
community members. 92 In 2016, for example, the police department in Lexington,
Kentucky, hired two licensed social workers to follow up with individuals in crisis after

85.

Melissa S. Morabito, Amy N. Kerr, Amy Watson, Jeffrey Draine, Victor Ottati & Beth Angell, Crisis

Intervention Teams andPeople with Mental Illness: Exploring the Factorsthat Influence the Use ofForce, 58
CRIME & DELINQ. 57, 71-72 (2012).

86. Melissa S. Morabito, Kelly Socia, Amanda Wik & WilliamH. Fisher, The Nature andExtent ofPolice
Use of Force in Encounterswith People with BehavioralHealth Disorders,50 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 31, 31
(2017).
87. Kane et al., supra note 64, at 116; Sema A. Taheri, Do CrisisIntervention Teams Reduce Arrests and
Improve Officer Safety? A Systematic Review andMeta-Analysis, 27 CRIM. JUST. POLY REv. 76, 90 (2016).
88.

Crisis

Unit,
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CHAPEL

HILL,

http://www.townofchapelhill.org/government/departments-services/police/divisions/specialty-units/crisis-unit
[http://perma.cc/8UC9-DBH6] (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
89. See Stephen Puntis, Devon Perfect, Abirami Kirubarajan, Sorcha Bolton, Fay Davies, Aimee Hayes,
Eli Harriss & Andrew Molodynski, A Systematic Review of Co-Responder Models of Police Mental Health
'Street'
Triage,
18
BMC
PSYCHIATRY
256,
256-57
(2018),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6094921/pdf/12888_2018_Article_1836.pdf
[http://perma.cc/EY2B-DKWQ].
90.

KRIDER ET AL., supra note 54, at 4.

91.

See id.; TOWN OF CHAPEL HILL, supra note 88.

92.

KRIDER ET AL., supra note 54, at 4-5.
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police concluded their first response. 93 Though co-responder models differ from the CIT
model by prioritizing interdisciplinary response, CIT training has been presented by
some proponents of co-responder models as an appropriate foundation for officers
serving on co-responder teams 94-despite the lack of evidence that CIT training
meaningfully affects officer behaviors in the field. 95
Little evidence exists to support the use of co-responder models or to suggest that
co-responder models will produce better outcomes than the classic, police-only CIT
approach; indeed, the research that does exist indicates that co-response may be just as
problematic. 96 A 2018 systematic review found insufficient evidence to conclude that
any positive benefits associated with co-responder models (such as reductions in arrest)
could be attributed to the co-response approach, suggesting that shifting public opinion
about behavioral crisis response could be the driver of these changes, not police
procedure. 9 7 The review found evidence that co-responder programs are more successful
at providing timely linkage with behavioral health services compared to traditional police
response. 98 At the same time, many studies included in the review found that individuals
who received a co-responder intervention reported previous traumatic interactions with
law enforcement, 99 suggesting that co-responder models may retraumatize persons
experiencing behavioral health crises, even if their risk of arrest is reduced.
Emerging data from the study of police-led, post-overdose outreach programs
reflects similar problems with police involvement. These programs typically involve a
co-responder team with at least one law enforcement representative conducting proactive
outreach to survivors of overdose within two to three days after the overdose
emergency. 100 A 2019 survey of these programs in Massachusetts found that 57% of
these programs check for warrants against the overdose survivor before conducting
outreach and that 11% arrest the overdose survivor on the authority of that warrant in
lieu of offering needed behavioral health supports.101 Qualitative research from this study
further suggests that increased law enforcement involvement in post-overdose
co-response directly contributes to increased likelihood of arrestand increased likelihood
of coercive responses to substance use,10 2 and that officer-involved outreach teams are

93. Josh Wood, The US Police Department that Decided To Hire Social Workers, GUARDIAN (Sept. 19,
2020, 5:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/sep/19/alexandria-kentucky-police-social-workers
[http://perma.cc/7KZ2-236Y].
94.

KRIDER ET AL., supra note 54, at 4.

95.

Kane et al., supra note 64, at 116.

96.

Puntis et al., supra note 89, at 10.

97.

Id. at 1.
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Id.

99.
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100.

See Formica et al., supra note 50, at 44.

101. Scott W. Formica, Katherine M. Waye, Allyn 0. Benintendi, Shapei Yan, Sarah M. Bagley, Leo
Beletsky, Jennifer J. Carroll, Ziming Xuan, David Rosenbloom, Robert Apsler, Traci C. Green, Allie Hunter
Alexander Y. Walley, Characteristics of Post-Overdose Public Health-Public Safety Outreach in
Massachusetts, 219 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 1, 4 (2021) [hereinafter Formica et al., Characteristicsof
Post-Overdose].
102. Marco Tori, Emily Cummins, Leo Beletsky, Samantha F. Schoenberger, Audrey M. Lambert,
Shapei Yan. Jennifer Carroll, Scott W. Formica, Traci C. Green, Robert Apsler, Ziming Xuan & Alexander Y.
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often supportive of involuntary civil commitment for substance use disorder103 (a
potentially harmful response to substance use that is contradicted by current scientific
evidence104 ).
Policing experts have voiced similar skepticism about the appropriateness of law
enforcement involvement through co-responder models. When asked about the
Lexington model (described above), Jerry Ratcliffe, who teaches criminal justice studies
at Temple University, emphasized the lack of evidence for this police-led co-response
approach. 105 Alex Vitale, a sociologist at Brooklyn College, has further warned against
"turn[ing] police departments into hubs for social work" by noting that police-led
co-response could be detrimental to undocumented persons and persons on probation or
parole who may have a valid reason to distrust social workers hired by police
departments. 106 In sum, despite the wide implementation of the co-responder model and
the even wider implementation of the CIT model, systematic research has failed to
produce evidence that these approaches can successfully mitigate the risks of arrest,
abuse, or other trauma at the hands of police. Research has also failed to produce
evidence that these law-enforcement-led strategies improve outcomes compared to
traditional police response or that they are remarkably more effective at meeting
community needs without excessive violence compared to nonpolice alternatives.
B.

Law EnforcementIs the Wrong Toolfor This Job

If specialized training for law enforcement and law-enforcement-led co-response
teams have not been effective at improving the outcomes of behavioral-health-related
calls for service, why are these collaborations still presented as "invaluable" tools?1 07
One answer is that state and local governments have consistently prioritized the financial
support of law enforcement over other budgetary initiatives that could mitigate some of
the very problems to which CIT programs are ostensibly designed to respond. 108 Put
another way, shunting more and more resources into police department budgets is a
politically safe move for state and local leadership that buttresses the ideological inertia
that law enforcement agencies are the dominant form of first response that communities
want or need. 109

Walley, Warrant Checking Practices by Post-Overdose Outreach Programs in Massachusetts: A
Mixed-Methods Study, 100 INT'L J. DRUG POLY (forthcoming 2022).
103.

See Formica et al., CharacteristicsofPost-Overdose,supra note 101, at 6.

104. D. Wetb, A. Kamarulzaman, M.C. Meacham, C. Rafful, B. Fisher, S.A. Strathdee & E. Wood, The
Effectiveness of Compulsory Drug Treatment: A Systematic Review, 28 INT'L J. DRUG POLY 1, 7 (2016),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4752879/pdf/nihms751135.pdf [http://perma.cc/6TKV-CFJU].
105.

Wood, supra note 93.

106. Id.
107.

See Crisis Intervention Teams (CIT): An Invaluable Community Resource, NAMI Sw. WASH.,

http://namiswwa.org/crisis-intervention-teams-cit-an-invaluable-community-resource/
[http://perma.cc/7G3C-827Z] (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
108.
109.

See Rogers et al., supra note 56, at 417.

See Noah Smith, Spending So Much on PoliceHas RealDownsides, BLOOMBERG OP. (June 4, 2020,
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-06-04/police-budgets-reflect-political-power-not-need-to-co
ntrol-crime [http://perma.cc/P2M3-AS9G].
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Another explanation is that policymakers in state and local government have
historically failed at the necessary task of imagining a different (i.e., nonpolice) kind of
first response in their communities. Illustrative of this rationale are the numerous
historical attempts to reform, adapt, or repurpose law enforcement agencies towards
community-oriented response efforts, and how those attempts have subsequently failed
throughout the last century. The Police/Community Relations movement in the 1950s
and team policing in the 1970s were both meant to improve alignment between law
enforcement activity and community values. Yet each effort failed to generate
meaningful impact and ultimately petered out due in large part to a widespread
perception among law enforcement professionals that the missions of these auxiliary
programs deviated from the goals of "real policing."11 0 This ability of law enforcement
logics to overpower community-oriented training and protocols is even visible in the
ongoing opioid overdose epidemic. Today, police officers who work in urban areas most
affected by the overdose epidemic consistently associate mental health crises with
substance use and substance use with criminal behavior. As a consequence, the dominant
ideological frame that these officers impose upon behavioral-health-related calls for
service is one of surveillance and control, not de-escalation, assistance, and referral."
The biggest problem with CIT programs and similar law-enforcement-led
behavioral health response initiatives is not the failure of those programs to produce
meaningful outcomes (which, in fact, they do fail to produce). Rather, the biggest
problem is the way these programs forestall the development and consideration of
fundamentally new approaches to providing first response to calls for service from the
community. In other words, advocates for law-enforcement-led programs and
partnerships take for granted the presumption that law enforcement officers should be
involved in first response for behavioral health crises at all.11 2 Yet, as discussed in this
Article, the overwhelming evidence indicates that this is not the case.
Law enforcement officers should not be included in first response to emergent
behavioral health emergencies for a number of reasons. In addition to the
abovementioned data, six additional arguments for excluding law enforcement personnel
from first response for behavioral-health-related calls for service are outlined below.
First, per the 2008 census of state and local law enforcement agencies (which, at
the time of writing, is the most recent data available), nearly half of the 18,000 state and
local law enforcement agencies in the United States employ fewer than ten sworn
officers; another quarter of those agencies employ between ten and twenty-five. 1 3 The
human resources available to these agencies are not sufficient to justify some or all of
those sworn officers pursuing unique and specialized skills that are already possessed by
other local health and human services professionals.
Second, the response to calls for service related to behavioral health crises
consumes an extraordinary amount of law enforcement resources as much as 87% more

110.

Watson et al., Improving PoliceResponse, supra note 60, at 361.

See Jade Boyd, Susan Boyd & Thomas Kerr, Visual andNarrativeRepresentationsofMentalHealth
andAddiction by Law Enforcement, 26 INT'L J. DRUG POL'Y 636, 642-43 (2015).
111.
112.

Cf NAMI, supra note 29.

113.

BRIAN A. REAVES, DEP'T OF JUST., CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES,

2008, at 1-2 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf [http://perma.cc/LY6C-GSPG].

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

20

[Vol. 94

resources than most other kinds of calls." 4 This disparity indicates an extreme mismatch
between the services that law enforcement officers are equipped to provide and the
services that are needed to respond to these incidents of community need.
Third, law enforcement agencies that attempt to implement community partnerships
are met with consistent and intractable challenges in those efforts, which reduce the
return to the community on these law-enforcement-centered investments. Programs like
CIT, for example, canbe challenging to adopt with fidelity because "they involve making
large scale changes to almost every facet of police operations from training and
scheduling to dispatch and patrol as well as forging partnerships with the mental health
community." 1 5 The investments required from both law enforcement and health systems
to implement such a change can be expensive,116 and the benefits, as discussed above,
are at best extremely modest.
Fourth, the lack of diversity in law enforcement is, itself, a reason why law
enforcement officers are ill-equipped to respond to emergent behavioral health crises. In
San Francisco, California, where women represent only 15% of all sworn officers," a
department policy that officers could only search same-sex suspects resulted in many
more male suspects being searched than female suspects.118 Thus, public
impressions and subsequently public complaints alleged that officers unfairly
targeted (mostly male) gang members in their patrol activities. 119 If lack of diversity
inhibits equitable policing, it must also inhibit equitable responses to behavioral health
emergencies.
Fifth, law enforcement involvement is a well-known exacerbator of behavioral
health concerns. Among individuals with a history of substance use, for example, law
enforcement interaction is known to be positively associated with the initiation of
substance injection. 120 Incarceration is known to be positively associated with both fatal
and nonfatal overdose, and the growing evidence base is congruent with the hypothesis
that this relationship is causal (meaning that incarceration most likely causes new
overdose events directly, not simply that people more likely to overdose are also more
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Yanick Charette, Anne G. Crocker & Isabelle Billette, Police Encounters Involving Citizens with
SERVS. 511, 511-12 (2014).
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260, 261 (2018).
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likely to become incarcerated at some point). 121 Moreover, officers who are concerned
about appearing racist individuals who might otherwise be identified as most qualified
to participate in a novel community partnership for their interest in the subject are
significantly more likely to voice increased support for unreasonable use of force and
disapproval of restrictions on use of force tactics. 12 2 On a broader level, a recent study
involving a sample of nearly 40,000 Black respondents in the United States found that
every police killing of an unarmed Black person that respondents were exposed to in the
past three months significantly predicted an average increase of 0.14 additional poor
mental health days per individual. 123 Excessive police use of force against a Black
individual injures every Black person in that community.
Sixth, and most importantly, research has repeatedly shown that individuals
experiencing noncriminal, behavioral health crises do not want a police response. A
qualitative study exploring mental health consumers' perceptions of formal crisis
services found that these individuals overwhelmingly preferred that a clinician be the one
to intervene; some participants voiced their acceptance of collaborative interventions,
but no one wanted a police response. 124 Similarly, a survey of more than 200 homeless
individuals nearly 80% of whom reported living with a mental illness found that
nearly half of respondents had interacted with police in the past month. 12 Many of these
individuals were handcuffed by police but experienced no other law enforcement use of
force; yet the physical restraint of cuffs alone was enough to leave participants feeling
disrespected and led to a deep erosion in their trust in law enforcement an effect that
was still measurable years after the handcuffing incident occurred. 126
For all these reasons, sworn officers employed by state and local law enforcement
agencies constitute an extremely poor choice when selecting first responders for
emergent behavioral health crises. They lack the training, the institutional support, the
infrastructure, the culture, the freedom, and the public image to respond to such calls for
service effectively. Though community partnerships with law enforcement may have
flourished in a political environment that favored allocating public funds into police
coffers, it is clear that providing a meaningful, safe, and effective response to behavioral
crises via law enforcement response requires law enforcement to be something that they
are not. Therefore, first responders to behavioral-health-related calls for service should

121. Sasha Mital, Jessica Wolff & Jennifer Carroll, The RelationshipBetween IncarcerationHistoryand
Overdose in North America: A Scoping Review of the Evidence, 213 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 1, 9
(2020).
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123. Jacob Bor, Atheendar S. Venkataramani, David R. Williams & Alexander C. Tsai, Police Killings
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Study, 392 LANCET 302, 306 (2018).
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(2016).
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not be law enforcement. First responders should consist of a different set of service
professionals entirely.
C.

The CAHOOTS Model

A behavioral health response program operated out of Eugene, Oregon, offers a
viable model for a nonpolice first response service for emergent behavioral health
crises-one that was used to inform the model legislation included in this Article and
that other community advocates could emulate in their own communities. Since 1989,
emergency dispatchers in Eugene have had the option of diverting calls for service
stemming from an emergent behavioral health or chronic housing crisis away from police
and towards a program called the Crisis Assistance Helping Out On The Streets, or
CAHOOTS. 1 2 7 CAHOOTS is not a law enforcement agency; it is a third-party, nonprofit
organization contracted by local law enforcement to respond to calls involving
nonviolent crises in lieu of a law enforcement response. 128 CAHOOTS team members
do not carry weapons. 129 Instead, they are armed with trauma-informed, de-escalation,
and harm-reduction strategies that allow them to address the emergent needs of civilians
in crisis while maximizing the safety of everyone involved. 130 While CAHOOTS staff
may be called to assist law enforcement already on scene, CAHOOTS is most often
dispatched by 911 operators without law enforcement assistance. 131 According to
CAHOOTS, police presence was required during only 250 calls out of the approximately
24,000 calls responded to in 2019 about 1% of the calls. 132
CAHOOTS responds to a variety of calls in which an armed law enforcement
response is neither necessary nor desired, including welfare checks (indicated in 32.5%
of diverted calls), transportation to social or medical services (indicated in 34.8% of
diverted calls), and public assistance (indicated in 6 6 .3 % of diverted calls). 133
CAHOOTS assists persons in need of nonemergency medical care and behavioral health
services (including services to assist with mental health and substance use issues,
episodes of psychosis, suicide threats, acute intoxication, and overdose). 134 CAHOOTS
provides transportation to social services, substance use treatment facilities, and
healthcare providers. 135 Over 60% of the persons CAHOOTS has served are homeless,
and 30% are persons living with severe and persistent mental illness. 13 6
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A CAHOOTS mobile team, which is dispatched to these calls for service, is
comprised of two persons: a medic (such as a nurse, paramedic, EMT-Intermediate, or
EMT-Basic) and a crisis worker who has training and experience in behavioral health
services (including substance use). 137 When the mobile crisis team responds to a call, it
provides immediate stabilization by addressing any emergent medical or psychological
concerns.138 The team then identifies how the person in need may be assisted through the
provision of information, referral to services, advocacy to resolve a particular issue, or,
if the situation warrants, transportation to a facility that can provide a higher level of
care.

139

The CAHOOTS model was years in the making a luxury that many community
advocates responding to police violence today do not have. 14 0 Public support for the
program grew organically thanks to the positive reputation of the nonprofit White Bird
Clinic, where the CAHOOTS program is housed.14 1 The White Bird Clinic is a
long-standing community institution in Eugene, operating since 1969142 as a 24-7
socio-medical station supporting individuals presenting with adverse drug experiences
in a "safe and supportive way." 14 3 As the White Bird Clinic tells it, "[w]ord quickly
spread that this was a place with caring and helpful people who didn't ask for money and
who didn'tjudge or lecture." 14 4
Though the unique history of CAHOOTS cannot be easily reproduced elsewhere,
community advocates can inform their current efforts by applying two major lessons
learned through the implementation of the CAHOOTS program. First, over its fifty years
in the greater Eugene community, the White Bird Clinic has worked hard to earn the trust
of the community it serves. 145 Therefore, community advocates seeking to build
non-law enforcement institutions to respond to behavioral-health-related calls for
service may want to seek community partners who are already building positive
relationships with the community-especially those members of the community who are
experiencing behavioral health or housing needs. This could include the staff of existing

137. Id. at 1. Crisis workers also receive over five hundred hours in training from CAHOOTS. Id. at 2.
138.

Id. at 1.

139. Id.
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2020,
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BRIDGE
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(Dec.
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2020),
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[http://perma.cc/7SZ5-PNXH] (describing incidents in which CIT programs were implemented rapidly
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weigh the benefits of alternative proposals).
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day or drop-in centers, harm reduction agencies, peer support specialists, recovery
groups, mutual support groups for behavioral health concerns, or drug user unions.14 6
Second, the trust that the CAHOOTS first-response program developed ensured the
program's success only after that program was coupled with an existing human services
network serving the wider community (i.e., beyond the White Bird Clinic as a single
point of service).147 Indeed, if local mental, social, and healthcare service offerings are
limited or operating with insufficient capacity to meet local needs, non-law enforcement
response efforts will have little to offer residents who require ongoing assistance once
emergent concerns are resolved. If a robust network of social services providers is not
established locally, programs modeled after CAHOOTS may decrease the harms
associated with unnecessary law enforcement interaction, but they will not have the
lasting impact CAHOOTS has had in Eugene. Insufficient healthcare and social services
capacity are not problems that first responders of any kind can resolve.
In addition to their success in providing appropriate and effective services to local
residents in crisis, CAHOOTS further estimates that their program has saved taxpayers
of Lane County, Oregon (where Eugene is located), an average of $8.5 million per year
in public safety costs alone.14 8 This is due in part to CAHOOTS' responding to and
ultimately resolving 17% of the Eugene Police Department's overall call volume. 149
Because CAHOOTS also responds to nonemergency medical issues, the program saves
taxpayers an additional $14 million in ambulance transport fees and emergency
department treatment costs annually. 150
It is relevant to community advocates working to establish similar programs that
CAHOOTS provides consulting and strategic guidance to communities seeking to
implement a model like CAHOOTS. 151 CAHOOTS staff will even assist advocates in
writing grant proposals to cover the costs of their initial planning and implementation
fees.152 As consultants, CAHOOTS representatives have made themselves available to
assist in training mental health crisis counselors by traveling to interested communities
and conducting field training, providing training manuals, guiding best practices
development, and helping in the interviewing and hiring processes.15 3 As of the writing
of this Article, CAHOOTS has been assisting the cities of Olympia, Washington, and
Denver, Colorado, in implementing their own mobile crisis response programs. 154

146. Drug user unions are peer-led organizations that fight for the health and rights of people who use
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III. THE POLICY STORY BEHIND THE MODEL BHRT ACT

A. The Tragic Death ofMarcusDeon Smith

As laid out in Section II, the untimely and unnecessary death of Marcus Deon Smith
at the hands of law enforcement as he was experiencing an emergent behavioral health
crisis served as the focusing event of local efforts to defund the police in Greensboro,
North Carolina. Recall that, on September 8, 2018, the Greensboro Police Department
encountered a thirty-eight-year-old Black man, later identified as Mr. Smith, running in
and out of traffic in downtown Greensboro, North Carolina, after his mother called 911
to report his crisis. 155 Police officers were the first public servants to appear at the
scene. 156

Mr. Smith was approached by officers and subsequently asked for their help. 15
"Please sir, please help me, sir," Mr. Smith begged the officers. 158 "They're gonna kill
me.... I want to go to the hospital." 159
"Boss man," an officer responded, "you need to chill out." 160
The officers put Mr. Smith into the back of a squad car. 161 This confinement further
agitated Mr. Smith, who began banging on the squad car's window. 162
"He's just buggin' out on somethin'," an officer said.163
The officers then decided 164 that they should hog-tie, or "RIPP Hobble," 165 Mr.
Smith, using a restraint that the Department of Justice has identified as capable of

155.

See Complaint at 5, Smithv. City of Greensboro, 2020 WL 1452114 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 10, 2019) (No.

1:19-cv-386).
156. See Man Who Collapsed in Police Custody Dies, GREENSBORO 101 (Sept 8, 2018, 5:31 AM),
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interfering with an individual's ability to breathe. 166 Even the manufacturers of the
device used to hog-tie167 Mr. Smith clearly state that it should never be used to hog-tie a

prisoner. 168

Nevertheless, police officers pulled (or pushed) Mr. Smith out of the car. 169
"I ain't resisting," Mr. Smith pled. 7 0
Officers hog-tied him anyway.171
After the restraint was in place, the officers realized that Mr. Smith was no longer
breathing.17 2 Mr. Smith died after being transported to the hospital by Emergency
Medical Services (EMS).17 3
Mr. Smith's official cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest caused primarily by
positional asphyxia, a known consequence of hog-tying.1 7 4 The City of Greensboro took
the official position that the officers involved followed all police procedures and did not
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restraints, cocaine-induced excited delirium (an acute mental disorder characterized by impaired thinking,
disorientation, visual hallucinations, and illusions) may increase a subject's susceptibility to sudden death by
effecting an increase of the heart rate to a critical level.").
167. Hog-tying refers to placing a person on their stomach, handcuffing them, restraining their legs, and
then connecting the restraints of the legs and the arms together, resulting in their elevation. See Gutierrez v. City
of San Antonio, 139 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1998); Vizbams v. Prieber, 761 F.2d 1013, 1015 (4th Cir. 1985).
This technique is often referred to by law enforcement as a "hobble," in part, because of the negative connotation
associated with the phrase "hog-tying." AELE L. Enf't Legal Ctr., RestraintandAsphyxia Part One Restraint
Ties, AELE MONTHLY L.J. 101, 103 (2008), http://www.aele.org/law/2008ALL12/2008-12MLJ101.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8PSX-9FJE].
168.

McDowell, Never Hog-Tie a Prisoner, supra note 165.

169.

See McDowell, Hogtying, Homicide andHumanity, supra note 164.

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Richard Barron, GreensboroReleases Video in Police Custody Death, NEWS & REC. (Dec. 1, 2018),
http://greensboro.com/news/crime/greensboro-releases-video-in-police-custody-death/article_aba68Ob 1-430b5d26-84be-0ba235aef016.html [http://perma.cc/4B5B-DTHJ] (reviewing findings from police body camera
footage).
174. NAT'L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP' T OF JUST., supra note 166, at 2; see also S.N. Kunz, S. b6r6ard6ttirc
& R. Rtnarsd6ttir,Restraint-RelatedAsphyxia on the Basis of a Drug-InducedExcited Delirium, 288 FORENSIC
SCI. INT'L e5, e5, e8 (2018) ("Cases of intoxication in combination with extreme agitation, physical exertion and
restraint are mainly associated with restraint-related deaths (RRD) in the context of police use of force."). The
official cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest brought on by the prone restraint, the presence of drugs in
his system and his preexisting cardiovascular disease. Jordan Green, MedicalExaminer 's Investigation into the
Death
of
Marcus
Deon
Smith,
SCRIBD,
http://www.scribd.com/document/394567666/Medical-examiner-s-investigation-into-the-death-of-Marcus-Deo
n-Smith [http://perma.cc/S23C-A3GB] (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) (presenting a copy of the medical examiner's
report on the death of Marcus Deon Smith).
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violate any policies in their treatment of Mr. Smith.1 7 5 The district attorney determined
that the police officers did not commit criminal negligence. 176 In sum, public officials
condoned the actions of the police officers, indicating that they had behaved as they were
trained and expected to act. The medical examiner ruled Mr. Smith's death a homicide.177
Notably, this was not Mr. Smith's first encounter with the police or EMS.17 8 Mr.
Smith was known to have been living with comorbid behavioral health issues and a
preexisting heart condition.179 Though acting erratically in his encounter with police
officers, Mr. Smith did not constitute a danger to the public. 180 He did not need armed
police officers to respond to his cries for help police officers who felt empowered to
use dangerous methods of restraint 181 that injured, dehumanized, and ultimately killed

175. News Release: City's Response to Press Conference Regarding Marcus Smith, GREENSBORO 101
(Nov.
14,
2018,
5:11
PM),
http://web.archive.org/web/20200211185930/https://greensboro 101. com/news-release-citys-response-to-pressconference-regarding-marcus-smith/
[http://perma.cc/2QGK-WPFD]
(re-printing
Greensboro
city
government's press conference condoning the actions of the police officers involved in Marcus Deon Smith's
death). The City made this statement despite the Greensboro Police Department Directives Manual chapter
11.1.4, stating that a hobble restraint should only be used if the subject can be restrained sitting up or laying on
their side. GREENSBORO POLICE DEP'T, GREENSBORO POLICE DEPARTMENTAL DIRECTIVES ch. 11.1.4 (2008),

http://www.greensboro-nc.gov/Home/ShowDocument?id=25639 [http://perma.cc/5X3R-XTWY]. The police
department chiefs response to this point when questioned was that Mr. Smith was not actively being transported.
See McDowell, Never Hog-Tie a Prisoner,supra note 165.
176. Jordan Green, Doug Henderson Letter re Marcus Smith, SCRIBD (Jan. 4, 2019),
http://www. scribd.com/document/396822043/Doug-Henderson-Letter-Re-Marcus-Smith
[http://perma.cc/G38C-66ZA] (presenting a copy of the Greensboro city attorney's official comment on the
culpability of law enforcement in Marcus Deon Smith's death).

177. Id.
178. Telephone Interview with Marcus Hyde, Former Organizer, Homeless Union of Greensboro (Aug.
6, 2020). During a previous incident that started much the same earlier in 2018, EMS and police arrived to help
Marcus Smith during a momentary mental health crisis, and transported him to the hospital, where he was cared
for and released back to the street. Id. While this did not address all of the underlying reasons why he was having
a mental health crisis while experiencing homelessness, it shows that there is a continuum of ways that public
health and safety systems can be designed to respond to public health issues. Id.

179. Id.
180.

See

#JusticeforMarcusSmith,

HOMELESS

UNION:

#JUSTICEFORMARCUSSMITH,

http://www.homelessunion.org/justicefornarcussmith [http://perma.cc/JJZ8-3UCZ] (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
181. While this Article focuses on proposing policies to decrease police encounters resulting in the use
of these potentially deadly restraints during initial encounters or pre-arrests, it is important to note that persons
that are incarcerated are also at risk of dying at the hands of officers seeking to restrain them. See, e.g., Jordan
Green, Placedin ProneRestraintby His Jailers, He Said, I Can'tBreathe.' The Cause ofDeath Was Asphyxia.,
TRIAD CITY BEAT (July 9, 2020), http://triad-city-beat.com/prone-restraint-i-cant-breathe-asphyxia/
[http://perma.cc/HV88-6UVE] (detailing the death of John Neville, who died from the use of a prone restraint
while incarcerated); see also Eric Mark, Corrections Officers Left LCCF Just Before Mackey Suit Settlement,
CITIZEN'S

VOICE

(Aug.

5,

2020),

http://www.citizensvoice.com/news/crime-emergencies/corrections-officers-left-lccf-just-before-mackey-suit-s
[http://perma.cc/3R3E-FLE4] (highlighting
ettlement/article_8a9ccb78-65aa-5092-a084-cdfa35519024.html
the death of Shaheen McKay, who also died from restraints while incarcerated). The New York Times has
identified at least seventy additional cases where individuals have died from an inability to breathe due to police
restraint. See Mike Baker, Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Manny Fernandez & Michael LaForgia, Three Words.
70 Cases. The Tragic History of I Can't Breathe.', N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2020),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/28/us/i-cant-breathe-police-arrest.html
[http://perma.cc/5JKE-KLYG].
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Mr. Smith. He needed help from someone who understood his lived experience and who
could de-escalate his behavioral health crisis humanely. He needed a person-centered
behavioral health crisis response team.
In response to the death of Mr. Smith, community organizers in Greensboro, North
Carolina, began pressuring members of Greensboro City Council to establish a non-law
enforcement service capable of responding to the scene of behavioral health emergencies
in lieu of the police.18 2 With no model statute in hand to provide a concrete policy
proposal for implementing such a request, advocates found themselves not in a legal
battle but a narrative battle. The struggle focused on whether local police were the
problem behind deaths, like those of Mr. Smith, or whether police constituted a central
component of the solution albeit one they argued was underfunded and
underequipped.18I3 In the end, community advocates were unsuccessful in controlling the
policy narrative. Greensboro City Council rejected proposals that would have excluded
law enforcement from behavioral-health-related calls for service, 184 instead choosing a
strategy that consists of "dually dispatch[ing]" both police and mental health workers to
a scene when a 911 operator "identif[ied] a call where they [we]re needed." 185
Persons who were party to the policy discussions noted that the prevailing
narratives leveraged to oppose advocates' proposal to implement the CAHOOTS model
were based upon several key suppositions: (1) the idea that law enforcement officers are
needed to protect the safety of other health and human service professionals on the scene
(a belief widely held among law enforcement officers across the United States);186 and
(2) the belief that co-responders, which included police officers, would be sufficiently
effective at fostering desired outcomes. Section II of this Article provides ample evidence
to refute both of these claims.
Despite the lack of evidence justifying law enforcement involvement in or
co-response to behavioral health calls (as described in Section II), the Greensboro City
Council chose to pursue a policy that allowed law enforcement agencies to maintain their
authority over behavioral health response, their legitimacy as a universal responder to all
calls for service, and all of their funding dollars associated with responding to those calls.
Importantly, the program chosen for implementation by the City of Greensboro included

182. Hyde Interview, supra note 178.
183. See Richard Barron,MarcusSmith SupportersMark the Anniversary ofHis Death with Vigil; Family
Lost, Still Confused with Unanswered Questions', NEWS & REC. (Sept.
8, 2019),
http://greensboro.com/news/local_news/marcus-smith-supporters-mark-the-anniversary-of-his-death-with-vigil
-family-still-lost-still/article_30f91206-73al-5ced-8b27-e9b89ea5cdd2.html [http://perma.cc/5JZK-ELUV].
'Still

184. See Richard Barron, Other Cities Have Mental-Health Response Teams. Now, Greensboro Does,
Too.,
NEWS
&
REC.
(Dec.
17,
2019)
[hereinafter
Barron,
Other
Cities],
http://greensboro.com/news/localnews/other-cities-have-mental-health-response-teams-now-greensboro-does
[http://perma.cc/3939-CCXV] (detailing the CIT
-too/article_a7c9753a-9a76-5be4-b42c-4246a33cf974.htm
program enacted by Greensboro City Council in response to Marcus Deon Smith's homicide at the hands of
police).
185.

Statementfrom GreensboroMayor Nancy Vaughan, GREENSBORO, N.C.: CITY NEWS (June 7, 2020,

9:01
AM),
[http://perma.cc/E4G7-XYYP].

http://www.greensboro-nc.gov/Home/Components/News/News/14807/36

186. In a study of more than 2,800 officers working in twenty states, 95% agreed with the statement that
it is important for law enforcement to be at the scene of an overdose in order to protect the safety of medical
personnel. See Carroll et al., supra note 10, at 3.
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no mechanism that would have prevented Mr. Smith from being killed by law
enforcement officers. 187
The goal of the Model BHRT Act, and the strategies for pursuing this or similar
policy adoptions, is to ensure that the historical cycle of law enforcement's interfering
with necessary efforts to divert responsibilities and resources away from law
enforcement agencies does not continue. This cycle is intractable, but not
insurmountable. Community advocacy groups generally do not have extensive lobbying
budgets, and if they are organized as public charities, they are prohibited from substantial
lobbying.188 They may, therefore, feel that they are at a great disadvantage in influencing
policy outcomes, especially when advocates go up against politically powerful interests,
like police unions. 189 Despite the popular belief that money buys votes, the empirical
evidence suggests that even grassroots advocacy groups can influence policy

outcomes.190
B. PressuringPolicymakers To Act

Political science research on legislative behavior has shown that advocacy groups
can positively influence the policymaking process by providing legislators with
assistance or support in the form of a legislative subsidy. 191 A legislative subsidy can
take many forms; however, they all share the characteristic of saving legislators time and
resources by providing subject-matter expertise to which the legislator did not previously
have access. 19 2
One type of legislative subsidy is model legislation. Model legislation provides an
immense time-saving subsidy to legislators and their staffers busy professionals who
no longer have to invest the time and effort to research and draft a policy proposal when

187. See Barron, Other Cities, supra note 184. Pursuant to the reform initially enacted in Greensboro,
North Carolina, trained counselors would respond to "many" calls "in tandem" with specially-trained police
officers. Richard Barron, Because ofSmith Tragedy, GreensboroPolice ChangesHow ItHandlesMental-Health
Calls,
NEWS
&
REC.
(Nov.
17,
2020),
http://greensboro.com/because-of-smith-tragedy-greensboro-police-changes-how-it-handles-mental-health-call
s/article_afa32876-2844-lleb-a46d-2394779cc51e.html [http://perma.cc/PA45-XJ56]. Mr. Smith was killed
during his initial interaction with police, so such a program would not have prevented Mr. Smith's death.
188. Jon S. Vernick, Lobbying andAdvocacy for the Public'sHealth: What Are the Limits for Nonprofit
Organizations?,
89
AM.
J.
PUB.
HEALTH
1425,
1426
(1999),
http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.89.9.1425 [http://perma.cc/JD3T-5XNZ].
189. See generally David Unger, Which Side Are We on: Can Labor Support #BlackLivesMatter and
Police
Unions?,
29
NEW
LAB.
F.
28
(2020),
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1095796020950309?casa_token=h23qVCnTYy0AAAAA: lpQz1

F_BFTcRb8oyZADFPLmFxRXd0BN3EJjA0WOi3DJTPnAdZVWMDyIir7eWXFdcnV3_N9b4P
[http://perma.cc/F2KC-VTAR] (reviewing the power of police unions in lobbying local governments).
190. See generally Taleed El-Sabawi, What Motivates Legislators To Act: Problem Definition & the
Opioid
Epidemic,
a
Case
Study,
15
IND.
HEALTH
L.
REv.
189
(2018),
http://journals.iupui.edu/index.php/ihlr/article/view/22880/22242
[http://perma.cc/QX75-YKZ2] (reviewing
how pressure groups influence legislative behavior).

191. See Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
69, 69 (2006) (explaining that "legislative subsidy" refers to the specialized information that organized interest
groups can provide to legislators, so that legislators do not have to expend costs in acquiring this information
themselves).
192. Id.

[Vol. 94

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

30

a functional proposal is already in hand. 193 Additionally, studies have shown that when
advocacy groups draft model legislation, the existence of that model legislation increases
the likelihood that they will control the narrative and institutionalize that narrative into
law. 194 Further, the possibility that a model policy proposal will be adopted increases
dramatically if advocacy groups form a coalition in support of the proposal and include
high-ranking members of state, county, or local government in that coalition. 195 Once
model legislation has been enacted in one jurisdiction, advocacy groups can use the prior
enactment to persuade policymakers in other jurisdictions to do the same.
The Model BHRT Act developed, and attached hereto as Appendix A, aligns with
best practices in behavioral health crisis management as outlined by the U.S. Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration's (SAMHSA) behavioral health crisis
guidelines. 196 The Act proposes new services modeled on the CAHOOTS program but
has been adapted to reflect input obtained through interviews with local advocacy groups
representing the populations that the BHRT teams would serve in Greensboro, North
Carolina. The Model BHRT Act also includes protective mechanisms that help insulate
the program from co-option by law enforcement agencies or providers. Section IV,
below, reviews the provisions in the Act and explains why the various clauses are
included. Section IV also provides additional recommendations on factors advocates
must consider in approaching state or local legislators.
IV. THE BHRT ACT AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The Act, printed in Appendix A, can be referred to as the Model Behavioral Health
Response Team Act, the BHRT Act, or the Act. The Act is divided into eleven sections,
each discussed in detail below. While model laws are typically drafted for enactment by
state legislatures, the BHRT Act has been written to be adopted at the state or local level,
with bracketed language included to allow for customization.

193. See Kristin N. Garrett & Joshua M. Jansa, Interest Group Influence in Policy Diffusion Networks,
15 STATE POL. & POL'Y Q. 387, 392 (2015) (finding that model legislation can influence the spread, or diffusion,
of policy).
194. For example, in a fifty-state comparison of statutory definitions of mental health disorders to be
covered under insurance parity laws, researchers found that in states where the National Alliance on Mental
Illness (NAMI) assisted legislators in drafting the bills, the laws were much more likely to mandate coverage
only for mental health disorders that were defined as biologically based disorders. Marcia C. Peck & Richard
M. Scheffler, An Analysis ofthe Definitions ofMentallllness Used in State Parity Laws, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS.
1089, 1091 (2002). This "biologically based" distinction between some disorders versus others was not grounded
in the scientific literature. Id. at 1090-91. However, its use furthered NAMI's goals of institutionalizing the
narrative that mental illness was a biologically-based disorder and should be treated like other brain disorders,
like Alzheimer's. Id.
195.

See generally FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, JEFFREY M. BERRY, MARIE HOJNACKI, DAVID C. KIMBALL

& BETH L. LEECH, LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY (2009).
196.
HEALTH

SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR BEHAVIORAL
CRISIS

CARE:

BEST

PRACTICE

TOOLKIT

(2020),

http://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/national-guidelines-for-behavioral-health-crisis-care-02242020.pdf
[http://perma.cc/S2VN-VHCH].
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A. BHRT Act Section II: The Purpose
Its purpose, stated in BHRT Act Section II, is to develop and implement non-law
enforcement administered crisis call centers (CCCs) and behavioral health crisis
response teams (BHRTs). The Act includes the appropriate language in brackets to aid
groups in their customization efforts.
B. BHRT Act Section III: Definitions

Section III of the Act defines phrases commonly used throughout the model
legislation. While most of the definitions used are straightforward, there are a few that
warrant further discussion. First, the term behavioral health consumer means anyone who
has received mental health or substance use treatment services in the past, has a mental
health or substance use disorder diagnosis, or has experienced a mental health or
substance use disorder. Second, peer specialist is defined as "any individual certified or
qualified as a peer specialist or as a recovery specialist by the appropriate agency or
organization." 19 7 A behavioral health consumer should not be a peer specialist, as defined
in this Act. 198
The behavioral health consumer is meant to provide the viewpoint of a person who
is not a professional someone who is not credentialed or trained but rather has lived
experience and can bring that experience to bear in emergent crises. For years, the
dominant approach in training recovery or peer counselors who would assist in
twelve-step recovery treatment was to engage persons who had, themselves, already gone
through the twelve steps. 199 These individuals would become peer specialists or recovery
coaches, serving as staff or volunteers in the same programs they completed. 200 While it
may be advantageous to have treatment providers who have lived experience
themselves, 201 the peer specialist role has since evolved into a professional or
credentialed role in many states. 202 Now, even national professional organizations exist

197.

See infra Appendix A, BHRT Act § III(d).

198.

See infra Appendix A, BHRT Act § III(a).

199. Twelve-step programs are programs that are based on guidelines created by founders of Alcoholics
Anonymous that heavily utilize peer support groups. See The Purpose of the 12 Steps, ADDICTION CTR.,
http://www.addictioncenter.com/treatment/12-step-programs/ [http://perma.cc/LG35-SM3B] (last updated Aug.
12, 2020) (providing history of Alcoholics Anonymous and its role in developing the twelve-step methodology).
200. See Who Is a Peer Support Specialist?, N.C.'S CERTIFIED PEER SUPPORT SPECIALIST PROGRAM,
http://pss.unc.edu/#:~:text=The/o20North/o20Carolina/o20Certified/o20Peer,health/o20or/o20substance % 2 0u

se%20disorder [http://perma.cc/P6PW-4TWL] (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) (describing the requirements for
becoming a peer support specialist in North Carolina).
201. See, e.g., Louise Byrne, Promoting Lived Experience Perspective: Discussion Paper Prepared for the
Queensland Mental Health Commission (Feb. 16, 2017) (unpublished discussion paper on file with author)
(explaining that "lived experience provided services, particularly peer roles, contribute to an improved sense of
hope, empowerment and social inclusion for those accessing services").
202.

In 1999, Georgia was able to secure payments from Medicaid for a certified peer specialist,

encouraging other states to follow suit. LYN LEGERE, SERA DAVIDOW & W. MASS PEER NETWORK, THE
PROVIDER'S

HANDBOOK

ON

DEVELOPING

&

IMPLEMENTING

PEER

ROLES

7

(2014),

http://www.psresources.info/images/stories/A_Providers_HandbookonDevelopingImplementingPeer_R
oles.pdf [http://perma.cc/HDN9-6US2]; see also N. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.22A (2019) (setting forth the statutory
requirements to become a credentialed peer support specialist in North Carolina).
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to certify peer specialists. 203 Peer specialist groups may have sought credentialing to
establish minimum standards, ensure a certain level of quality, and enable peer specialists
to receive appropriate payment for their services rendered through Medicaid and other
insurance programs. 204 However, these facts do not detract from the reality that peer
specialists constitute an established professional group that identifies as such, distinct
from individuals who identify solely as persons who have had behavioral health issues
or persons who have consumed behavioral healthcare. In acknowledgment of this history,
the Act uses the term "consumer" over "peer," in part to prioritize persons who have
lived experience with mental health and substance use conditions that may have
necessitated the navigation of the behavioral healthcare system. Such persons are best
situated to explain how to navigate the system and understand firsthand that the choice
to seek treatment is, in and of itself, a choice that only the person experiencing a crisis
can make.
Occasionally, some advocacy groups and scholars have presented dislike for the
word "consumer"; however, such aversion was rooted in the belief that the term
consumer indicated that persons with behavioral health conditions do not have the right
to behavioral healthcare and that such healthcare is instead a commodity that should be
bought and sold in the marketplace. We are sensitive to these criticisms. Nevertheless,
the term is useful for its implicit reference to its historical use by mental health advocates
in the 1970s.
In the 1970s, advocates sought to decenter the "patient" narrative, which depicted
psychiatrists and psychologists as professionals capable of making decisions on behalf
of their patients and "patients" as individuals who should be placed under that
professional control. 2 5 The term "consumer" was embraced by these groups to
discursively wrench back some of the power that mental health institutions have
traditionally leveraged to force people into residential treatment or onto psychiatric
medication. 206 In this context, the term consumer was meant to communicate that persons
with diagnosed mental illness or other mental health issues retain the agency to choose
for themselves what type of treatment they will seek and even whether they want to seek
treatment at all.207

203. See,
e.g.,
MHA
Peer
Programs,
MENTAL
HEALTH
AM.,
http://www.mhanational.org/mha-peer-programs [http://perma.cc/H5PD-EGR6] (last visited Nov. 1, 2021)
(describing the process for national certification as a certified peer support counselor).
204.

See generally SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS.

DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM TO
CERTIFIED

COMMUNITY

IMPROVE

ADMIN., CRITERIA FOR THE

COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTERS AND TO ESTABLISH

BEHAVIORAL

HEALTH

CLINICS

(2016),

http://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/programs campaigns/ccbhc-criteria.pdf
[http://perma.cc/U57P-UAEY] (summarizing requirements for federal payment and reimbursement of peer
support specialist costs).
205.

See Athena Helen McLean, From Ex-PatientAlternatives to Consumer Options: Consequences of

Consumerism for Psychiatric Consumers and the Ex-Patient Movement, 30 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVS. 821,
822-23 (2000) (tracing the evolution of the anti-psychiatry movement in the United States).
206.

See id. at 821. See generallyELYN R. SAKS, THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD: MY JOURNEY THROUGH

MADNESS (2007) (chronicling Professor Saks's experiences with coercive practices in mental health treatment
in the United States).
207.

See McLean, supra note 205, at 821.
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In an effort to emphasize that the purpose of the BHRT program is not to make it
easier to institutionalize persons who have behavioral health conditions, the BHRT Act
uses the term "consumer." It should also be noted that using the term consumer instead
of peer further underscores the need to include a person on the Advisory Board with lived
experience in the behavioral healthcare system whose primary role is not as a
professional but as a directly impacted person.
Additionally, Section III(e) of the Act defines sexual minorities but does not define
racial or ethnic minorities, immigrant communities, or persons with disabilities. If
possible, policymakers should reference definitions of these vulnerable groups as found
in their respective state antidiscrimination laws.
Finally, we recommend using person-first language 208 whenever possible. We
understand that there are critiques of the use of person-first language 209 and that there are
more contemporary ways to reference persons from minority groups, but the acceptance
of these new terminologies is not as widespread. 210 The use of person-first language is
rooted in the discourse of monumental lobbying efforts by groups of persons with
disabilities to highlight that they are people first and not defined by their disabilities. 211
C. BHRT Act Section IV: Authorization

To facilitate the local government's implementation of the proposed BHRT
program, the Act includes a section that expressly authorizes the local government to
establish and operate a CCC and a BHRT program that is not administered or staffed by
law enforcement. Such authorization language may be necessary due to the division of
powers in the state of enactment, a topic that will be discussed further in this Part.
In order to further protect the BHRT from co-option, the Act makes use of an
Advisory Board. BHRT Act Section IV(b) establishes the Advisory Board, "which
should be comprised of at least 51% behavioral health consumers, persons who have
experienced or are experiencing houselessness, members of local immigrant
communities, sexual minorities, persons with disabilities, and racial or ethnic
minorities." The way in which the Advisory Board is structured allows for

208.

The Office of Disability Rights describes person-first language as follows:
"People First Language" (PFL) puts the person before the disability, and describes what
a person has, not who a person is. PFL uses phrases such as "person with a disability,"
"individuals with disabilities," and "children with disabilities," as opposed to phrases
that identify people based solely on their disability, such as "the disabled."

People

First
Language:
Usage
Guidelines,
DC.GOV:
OFF.
DISABILITY
http://odr.dc.gov/page/people-first-language [http://perma.cc/QD4S-7F9S] (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).

RTS.,

209. See generallyMorton Ann Gernsbacher, EditorialPerspective: The Use of Person-FirstLanguage
in Scholarly Writing May Accentuate Stigma, 58 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 859 (2017) (arguing that
person-first language increases stigma).
210. For example, Pew Research Center has found that many Hispanics prefer to be called Hispanics
versus Latinx. See Luis Noe-Bustamante, Lauren Mora & Mark Hugo Lopez, About One-in-FourU.S. Hispanics
Have Heard of Latinx, but Just 3%
Use It, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Aug.
11, 2020),
http://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2020/08/11/about-one-in-four-u-s-hispanics-have-heard-of-latinx-but-jus
t-3-use-it/ [http://perma.cc/HZ6Y-5L4R].
211. Dana S. Dunn & Erin E. Andrews, Person-First and Identity-First Language: Developing
Psychologists' Cultural Competence Using DisabilityLanguage, 70 AM. PSYCH. 255, 256 (2015) (advocating
for the use of person-first language by psychologists when speaking about persons with disabilities).
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representatives of provider groups; however, it attempts to maintain control of the Board
by vulnerable community members by requiring that a simple majority of Board seats at
any given time be held by those groups identified in Section IV(b).21 2 If possible, at least
one person from each of the aforementioned populations, as well as one person who has
been formerly incarcerated, should be selected. Ideally, 75% of the Board would be
representatives from vulnerable populations, but the Act uses 51% as a minimum
threshold. Legislators should tailor the membership of the Board to reflect the
demographics of the local community.
We arrived at the categories of groups included in the Act through discussions with
the community of grassroots activists in Greensboro, North Carolina. The list of
vulnerable populations was developed based on input received from multiple advocacy
groups in Greensboro, North Carolina, which included a coalition of groups for police
reform, "Greensboro Rising,"2 13 the Homeless Union of Greensboro, the NC Survivors
Union (the local drug users union), Guilford for All (a local progressive coalition),
representatives from Greensboro immigrant community, and representatives from the
Greensboro Democratic Party leadership.
The minimum number of members on the Advisory Board is set at seven people,
each with a term of two years. Advocacy groups will want to consider whether they
would like to add term limits for board members in order to reduce opportunities for
highly capable individuals to exert disproportionate control over the program. We have
also suggested an application process for vetting and appointing Advisory Board
members; however, we encourage advocacy groups to tailor this application process to
coincide with the local politics and government structure. The responsibilities of the
Advisory Board are outlined in Sections V and VII(b) of the Act.
D. BHRT Act Section V Implementation Procedure

BHRT Act Section V requires that the appropriate governmental department work
with the Advisory Board to create a CCC and BHRT program plan within six months of
the enactment of the Act. This program plan must include the following: (1) protocols
and procedures for establishing a designated non-law enforcement crisis response phone
number for the public to call; (2) procedures for call routing to BHRTs; (3) a plan to
market the crisis phone number and CCC/BHRT program to the community;
(4) protocols and procedures for the BHRT; (5) staffing requirements for CCC and
BHRT; and (6) a minimum standardized set of data to be collected from the CCC and
BHRT program, including, but not limited to, demographic information of program
participants, the general nature of the calls received, and the services provided.
Government officials, in collaboration with the Advisory Board, should procure the
recommendations of CAHOOTS, particularly as applied to call routing procedures,
staffing requirements, and protocols. The history of CIT programs2 " offers a cautionary
tale. Programs not implemented with fidelity to their model are greatly hindered in their
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See generally infra Appendix A.
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ability to produce meaningful or desired outcomes. Though the precise details of this
program will not be appropriate for every community, CAHOOTS is a time-tested and
evidence-based approach to implementing a BHRT program. 215 While adaptation of
some kind will always be necessary, the technical assistance that CAHOOTS can provide
to communities implementing BHRT programs for the first time should not be
undervalued. If funding is an issue, and local governments cannot allocate funds to cover
costs associated with consultation from the CAHOOTS program, advocacy groups or
government officials should discuss their limitations with CAHOOTS or other technical
support agencies and consider seeking funds through private or federal block grants.
CAHOOTS provides grant-writing assistance so that cities can get the funding they need
to offset CAHOOTS consultation and start-up costs. 216
Section V(c) of the Act requires that the CCC and BHRT report data gathered, as
defined by Section V(a)(vi), to the Advisory Board each quarter. BHRT Act Section V(c)
also requires the CCC and BHRT to make the data available to the public. Public
oversight will help ensure that program effectiveness and benefit are analyzed in the
future, with the hopes that the data gathered will allow for modifications and
improvements to the program. To protect the privacy of the persons served by the CCC
and BHRT program, the Act requires that services be rendered to persons without asking
for identifying information217 and that all publicly posted data be appropriately
de-identified.
E. BHRT Act Section VI: ProgramRequirements

BHRT Act Section VI outlines a list of program requirements. Section VI(a) of the
Act requires that the BHRT program be the primary, if not sole, first responder to crises
that do not require an armed law enforcement response. This includes crises involving
homelessness, intoxication, disorientation, substance use, mental illness, and wellness
checks. Doing so differentiates the BHRT from co-responder models or CIT, which are
consistently dispatched with law enforcement. Section VI(b) of the Act requires that the
BHRT provide immediate stabilization in case of urgent medical need or psychological
crisis, assessment, information, referrals, advocacy, and, if requested by the affected
individual, transportation to a facility that can provide a higher level of care. Again,
emphasis is placed on facilitating access to treatment, if desired, rather than forced
institutionalization.
Section VI(c) of the Act mandates that each BHRT has not only an EMS personnel
and a trained mental health crisis counselor but also a behavioral health consumer. To
increase the likelihood that the BHRT response team will be consumer centered, the Act
departs from the CAHOOTS model in its requirement that the BHRT has a behavioral
health consumer on the mobile crisis response team. The primary role of the behavioral
health consumer is to (1) ensure that the person in crisis is treated in a supportive and
empowering way and is given agency over themselves, and (2) to ensure to those in crisis
and to those immediately involved that the BHRT is not simply another coercive mental
health team looking to involuntarily commit or force a person into treatment. Behavioral
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See supra Part JJ.C for an outline of the evidence base supporting CAHOOTS efficacy.
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health consumers can use their lived experience in aiding a person in crisis and in offering
traditional "peer support" by "encouragement, empathy, hope, consideration, respect and
empowerment from the vantage point of experiential understanding. 2 18
As previously discussed, the history of behavioral health treatment in the United
States is fraught with examples of patient coercion and disenfranchisement, often
including widespread institutional failure to link consumers to evidence-based treatment.
Sections VI(d)-(h) of the Act include some additional safeguards that help ensure the
provision of nonjudgmental, person-centered, evidence-based care. Those Sections
require that the BHRT provide information and access to more than one behavioral health
treatment type if requested, including information on how to access medication for opioid
use disorders when indicated, as stigma against this evidence-based form of care often
creates an artificial barrier to treatment. 2 19 To help further protect against unnecessary
institutionalization, Section VI of the Act mandates that the BHRT refer persons in need
to the least restrictive treatment setting available if transportation is required.
F. BHRT Act Section VII: Funding
BHRT Act Section VII(a) authorizes the governing body to appropriate funding for
the CCC and BHRT program. Section VII(b) of the Act establishes an additional power
of the Advisory Board: the power to approve how the budget is allocated for the BHRT
and CCC programs. On the issue of funding, the Act is purposefully vague and
nonspecific, due in part to the variance in city, county, and state budgets across the
country. Advocates should lobby the state government to fund such initiatives or, if there
is a political window of opportunity for action, pressure local government officials to
shift some of the police budget to fund the BHRT. Indeed, a primary goal in developing
this Model BHRT Act was to create a feasible and successful alternative that could fill a
need for services potentially created by defunding police. While future research needs to
be conducted to validate their findings, CAHOOTS has reported a significant
multimillion-dollar savings to the City of Eugene. 2 20 This evidence can be used to
convince fiscally conservative politicians that the BHRT will have a similar cost-saving
function.
G. PotentialImplementation Issues & Recommendations

The BHRT Act is purposefully silent on the organizational structure of the BHRT
program and whether the BHRT would be (1) a part of the local government or (2) a
private, nonprofit entity that is contracted with the local government. The Act does not
designate a particular structure because there are significant differences in how states
allocate power to local governments and variances in local politics that will need to be
accounted for. In this Part, we review factors that advocacy groups should consider in
determining how to structure the BHRT program.
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BHRT as a Local Government Entity

One benefit of establishing the BHRT as a government program is that greater effort
would be required (possibly up to and including the passing of new legislation) to end
the program. In the United States, governmental departments or agencies are rarely
disassembled, instead becoming longstanding fixtures. 2 2 1 Moreover, it would decrease
the likelihood that the BHRT program would be abandoned if political party control of
the local government changed. 222 State public employees also tend to have greater
protections against layoffs, 223 a feature which would decrease the likelihood that the
staffing of the BHRT would become subject to the whims of fluctuating local budgets.
If, however, the decision is made to place the BHRT within the local government, that
decision must be accompanied by careful consideration of whether the BHRT should be
placed in the municipal or county government.
In many states, county governments oversee the provision of mental health and
substance use treatment, as funded by state budget allocations through county mental
health and substance use treatment boards. 2 24 These county boards are often dominated
by behavioral healthcare provider groups 225 that are, collectively, a substantial and
powerful political lobby. 226 As with all lobbying groups, these provider groups often
engage in the political process in large part to protect their financial interests. 227 And,
while some of these behavioral healthcare providers may be nonprofit entities, the market
behavior of nonprofit providers is often indistinguishable from for-profit providers. 228
Undoubtedly, treatment providers can offer valuable resources to persons who choose to
enter into care, but many provider groups have been historically, and even
contemporaneously, associated with coercive treatment, 229 involuntary commitment, and
disenfranchisement of persons who use substances or persons living with mental

221. See, e.g., S. E. Condrey, Organizational and Personnel Impacts on Local Government
Consolidation:Athens-Clarke County, Georgia, 16 J. URB. AFFS. 371, 376 (1994) (discussing the entrenchment
of local governments).

222. See Richard Winters, Party Control and Policy Change, 20 AM. J. POL. SCI. 597, 597 (1976).
223. See Matissa Hollister, Employment Stability in the US. LaborMarket: Rhetoric Versus Reality, 37
ANN. REV. SOCI. 305, 310-11 (2011).
224. Michael F. Hogan, Perspective: Public-SectorMental Health Care: New Challenges, 18 HEALTH
AFFS. 106, 107-08 (1999); see also Wade H. Silverman, A Statewide Assessment ofMental Health Governing
Board Training Needs, 8 J. CMTY. PSYCH. 302, 302 (1980) (noting that these boards can be advisory boards or
governing boards). Boards allow the community to be represented in decisions but may not have much
administrative power. See Silverman, supra. Governing boards have more power and authority. Id. at 306.
225. In this Article, the term "behavioral healthcare provider groups" refers to coalitions, interest groups,
and groups of providers.
226. See, e.g., Larry R. Faulkner, David L. Cutler & Morris H. Middleton, A ParticipatoryPlanning
Processfor the Evaluation of Community Mental Health Centers, 18 CMTY. MENTAL HEALTH J. 169, 177 (1982)
(providing an example of how community mental health centers can lobby state government).
227. See Marie Hojnacki & David C. Kimball, OrganizedInterests and the Decision of Whom To Lobby
in Congress, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 775, 777 (1998).
228. Mark Duggan, HospitalMarket Structure and the Behavior of Not-For-ProfitHospitals, 33 RAND
J. ECON. 433, 433 (2002) (finding that not-for-profit hospitals, in general, behave like for-profit hospitals).

229. See Stefanie Klag, Frances O' Callaghan & Peter Creed, The Use ofLegal Coercion in the Treatment
of Substance Abusers: An Overview and CriticalAnalysis of Thirty Years ofResearch, 40 SUBSTANCE USE
MISUSE J. 1777, 1779 (2005).
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illness. 23 Further, Black people, Indigenous people, and other people of color are more
likely than their white peers to receive coercive treatment at the hands of behavioral
healthcare treatment providers. 231 Therefore, county officials may insist on involving
behavioral healthcare provider groups in the planning and implementation of BHRT. In
such cases, care should be taken to insulate the Act from self-serving modifications
proposed by provider groups. Perhaps most importantly, provider groups should not be
permitted to insinuate themselves into the new institutions that the Act creates; otherwise,
as with co-option by law enforcement, communities run the risk of substituting one form
of coercive restraint for another.
Regardless of the influence of provider groups, advocacy groups may decide that
county-level adoption of the Act, and its absorption within the county government, is
best because it expands access to services provided by the BHRT to the entire population
of the county, and because in many states EMS is administered by the county
government. 232 Housing the emergency call center and BHRT within EMS has both
political and practical advantages. In many states, EMS has the authority to dispatch
emergency response services, often overseeing the 911 call system in place of law
enforcement oversight.233 Therefore, many EMS agencies already have the practical
expertise needed to manage a crisis call system and can even integrate the CCC into the
existing infrastructure, decreasing redundancy in staffing and expenditures. Further, by
maintaining a single emergency call line (911), the implementation of BHRT will feel
seamless to members of the public, who do not need to learn new emergency call
numbers or remember to distinguish between different service systems when calling for
help. The drawbacks to housing the entire BHRT within EMS can be institutional bias
that arises should EMS be administered by the same county or municipal department that
oversees public safety. 234 Existing EMS personnel may also bring with them their

230. See Arthur Robin Williams, Shelly Cohen & Elizabeth B. Ford, Statutory Definitions of Mental
Illness for Involuntary Hospitalization as Related to Substance Use Disorders, 65 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 634,
634-35 (2014); see also PEMINA YELLOW BIRD, WILD INDIANS: NATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE HIAWATHA
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231. See Marguerite J. Ro, Carolina Casares, Henrie M. Treadwell & Kisha Braithwaite, Access to Mental
Health Care and Substance Abuse Treatment for Men of Color in the US.: Findingsfrom the National
HealthcareDisparitiesReport, 12 CHALLENGE 65, 71 (2006).
232. EMS administration does vary state by state and even county by county, as does the definition of
what an EMS is and whether it is fire department based or hospital based. See COMM. ON THE FUTURE OF
EMERGENCY CARE IN THE U.S. HEALTH SYS., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., EMERGENCY MEDICAL
60
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234. See Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Integration of Health Services, EMERGENCY MEDICAL
SERVICES: AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE, http://one.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/ems/agenda/emsman.html#SERVICES
[http://perma.cc/YP2W-GR5C] (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
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preferential biases for police escorts and insist that law enforcement officers remain first
responders that secure the scene and establish safety. 235
Additionally, human or social services agencies tend to operate at the county level.
However, it is not advised to house BHRT programs within county social services
agencies. Social services agencies make reports to parole officers, drug court
representatives, and other authorities in community supervision, and persons with
behavioral health or housing problems may have had prior negative encounters with such
agencies. 236 Moreover, county social services agencies have historically treated
vulnerable communities paternalistically; rather than empowering them, such agencies
leave the populations they serve feeling marginalized. 23 7 Many of these interactions have
evidenced racial biases and have led to poorer outcomes for communities of color. 23 8
Many jurisdictions have taken steps to remedy this sordid past and rebuild relationships
with communities; 23 9 however, much work still needs to be done. Ultimately, placing a
BHRT program within an institution with a contentious and racialized relationship with
the larger community risks that the BHRT will take on the characteristics of its parent
institution.
If implementation and administration of the BHRT program at the county level are
not politically or practically feasible, advocates can look to municipal governments to
administer and implement the program. While, in many jurisdictions, advocacy groups
may have a choice as to which level of government to approach, advocacy groups in
some states may be limited based on the statutory authority each level of government has
to act. States differ in how much power they allocate to their county and municipal
governments. 24 0 Generally, states are said to follow either "home rule" or "Dillon's rule"
in how they divide powers between state and local governments. 24 1 Home rule authorizes
local governments to act in all instances not expressly prohibited by state or local law. 24 2
States that follow Dillon's rule, on the other hand, only authorize local governments to
act if the state legislature has explicitly granted the authority, or the authority is implied
or reasonably necessary to exercise express powers granted by the state. 2 4 3 Not all states
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fit neatly within these designations. In North Carolina, for example, there exists a line of
cases that reject Dillon's rule but instead adopt an even more restrictive standard.2 44
If advocates live in a state that follows Dillon's rule, or an equally restrictive law,
then county and municipal governments may be limited in their authority to implement
a BHRT program. Most likely, this will affect municipal adoption more so than county
adoption, because counties in most jurisdictions have at least one department (such as
EMS) with the authority to regulate and provide for the health of the citizens and
therefore capable of housing the BHRT. Municipal governments like that of
Greensboro, North Carolina may be limited in their ability to enact policies outside of
their specifically authorized powers. In Greensboro, for example, the only departments
that run through the city manager's office amenable to housing a BHRT program are the
911 call center (funded by the county), fire, police, and human relations.2 45 All these
departments are suboptimal choices given the implementation concerns discussed above.
Moreover, at the municipal level, fire, police, and the 911 call center may be placed under
the same city manager, forming a "public safety" arm of the municipal government,2 4 6
rendering these departments potentially problematic choices for housing BHRT.
Practically speaking, it may make sense to place the BHRT program within the
public safety arm, given local circumstances. However, advocates should be wary of
such shared management schemes, which may put the BHRT at greater risk of being
co-opted and tucked under or within the police department or another law enforcement
agency. If care is not exercised in protecting the autonomy of the BHRT, it could become
yet another law enforcement-led response.
2.

BHRT as a Nonprofit Government Contractor

CAHOOTS, the program on which the BHRT Act is modeled, is managed by the
police department and is located underneath the public safety arm of the municipal
government.2 47 CAHOOTS itself, however, is a private, nonprofit entity that operates via
a third-party contract provided by law enforcement.2 48 Structuring the BHRT as a private,
nonprofit entity, like CAHOOTS, also has its advantages. If advocates find that they are
getting more local support for the adoption of the Act as a municipal ordinance, then

N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 2007). It should be noted that Dillon's Rule is a rule of strict construction, so any doubts as
to whether a local government has the requisite authority will be resolved against the local government.
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perhaps the creation of a private, nonprofit entity that contracts with law enforcement
agencies or public safety departments may be best. As a private, nonprofit entity, the
BHRT will be more insulated from fluctuating local politics, a feature that staff at
CAHOOTS have cited as a benefit.24 9 Such arrangements appear to operate best in cities
with more progressive police departments or in cities with predominantly progressive
voters that will hold city officials accountable like that of Eugene, Oregon, where
CAHOOTS is located. 250 CAHOOTS' longstanding success 251 suggests that this model
is workable if the political circumstances permit.
Finally, advocates who choose to opt for the implementation of the Act through the
use of a private, nonprofit entity contracted with the local government should first ensure
that a private, nonprofit organization exists that is equipped to take on the duties of a
BHRT. Advocacy groups are strongly encouraged to explore the types and capacities of
services available in their state and identify gaps that could undermine the
implementation of a BHRT program. When assessing available services, local advocates
are well-advised to hold focus groups of persons who have lived experiences in the state
and local service delivery systems. Only by hearing the stories of affected persons will
advocacy groups be able to identify issues with care continuity, racial bias, and access
that are not readily identifiable by the service providers or even siloed groups. Advocacy
groups can then use this knowledge to tailor the BHRT to truly fit the needs of their
community.
In sum, advocates looking to propose the BHRT Act will have to consider whether
the BHRT program should (1) be part of the county or municipal government or (2) be
provided by a private, nonprofit entity that is contracted with the local government. The
BHRT Act has been written to allow for customization based on the factors mentioned
above.
CONCLUSION

The deaths of Marcus Deon Smith (Greensboro, 2018) and Joseph Dewayne
Robinson (Memphis, 1987) bear eerie similarities. Both were Black men with histories
of substance use and chronic mental illness. Both were experiencing a mental health
crisis at the time of their deaths. Both were met by law enforcement in the midst of their
crises, and those officers responded to both men in their time of greatest need with
excessive use of force intended to overpower violent and willful resistance. Both men
unnecessarily lost their lives as a result of these lethal and inappropriate law enforcement
actions. In the subsequent administrative review of both killings, the officers' deadly
choices in the field were deemed to be procedurally sound.
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That these killings took place more than thirty years apart is a powerful testament
to the profound intractability of a law enforcement culture that tolerates if not
enables-anti-Black racism, other racisms, and stigma against behavioral health
concerns, often with deadly consequences. In the wake of so many violent, unnecessary,
and preventable deaths (including the deaths of Eric Garner, Michael Brown, Tamir Rice,
Walter Scott, Alton Sterling, Freddie Gray, Sandra Bland, Philando Castile, Corey Jones,
Antronie Scott, Joseph Mann, Stephon Clark, Donnelle Thompson, Jamarion Robinson,
Deborah Danner, Jordan Edwards, Mikel McIntyre, James Lacy, Damon Grimes,
Charleena Lyles, Marcus-David Peters, Charles Roundtree Jr., Jemel Roberson, Sterling
Higgins, Pamela Turner, Elijah McClain, Atatiana Jefferson, Michael Dean, Darius
Tarver, William Green, Cornelius Frederick, David McAtee, Breonna Taylor, George
Floyd, and many, many others), social support for defunding the police has swelled such
that nearly one in three Americans today is in favor of reducing financial support for law
enforcement agencies, 2 2 and commensurately reducing their scope of work.
This Article has argued, based on the current science of law-enforcement-inflicted
injury on vulnerable populations, that removing law enforcement's mandate to respond
to calls related to behavioral health and housing crises is reasonable and appropriate. 253
Yet, without adequate funding and statutory mandates to establish humane behavioral
health services and response teams to take up that mandate, dismantling existing law
enforcement infrastructures will simply create a vacuum that will most certainly be filled
by different yet equally inappropriate systems already at hand. This truth is evidenced in
the way jails have filled the existing gaps in mental health services across the country. 24
The co-opting of public health policy proposals by law enforcement is not a new
phenomenon. Law enforcement professionals have successfully framed themselves as
authorities on numerous public health issues over which they have no real expertise,
including substance use, overdose, linkage to substance use treatment, and the
management of mental health crises. When policymakers in Greensboro, North Carolina,
enacted their policy solutions to the police actions that caused Marcus Deon Smith's
death, public health responses were co-opted into the criminal justice system.
The BHRT Act seeks to interrupt that cycle by requiring that the crisis response
team empowered by the Act contains at least one nonprofessional, behavioralhealth
consumer and by creating an Advisory Boardwith oversight powers comprised of at least
51% nonprofessionals with lived experience. Rather than responding to individuals in
crisis with coercion and violence, this program would seek to connect participants to
housing, mental health counseling, harm reduction services, and other forms of support
throughout the community.
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No single program can address structural issues that create and reinforce behavioral
health concerns and social vulnerability. A BHRT program cannot address larger issues
like the chronic underfunding of behavioral health services or the severe lack of
affordable housing in many areas. Likewise, a BHRT program cannot end racism or
eliminate the profound disparities across racial and ethnic divides in this country. What
well-designed BHRTs can do, however, is ensure that people struggling with
homelessness, people who use substances, and people with emergent behavioral health
concerns are treated with dignity and respect, ending systemic cycles of stigma and harm
in first response.
Above all, our proposal emphasizes the care that must be taken in creating new
institutions to replace the old ones that we dismantle. It reminds us all that these new
institutions must reflect the values and needs of the people that it serves. We must be
intentional about creating institutions that will not replicate the racist and oppressive
systems of the past, which have reinforced pervasive stigma, racism, and
marginalization. Instead, we must fundamentally reimagine what public safety can look
like, creating systems that are useful, dignifying, and equitable for all people who need
care.
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APPENDIX A

THE MODEL BEHAVIORAL HEALTH RESPONSE TEAM ACT
By Taleed El-Sabawi, M.S., J.D., Ph.D.
Jennifer J. Carroll, Ph.D., M.P.H.

SECTION I. SHORT TITLE.
This Act can be referred to as the Model Behavioral Health Response Team Act,
the BHRT Act, or the Act.
SECTION II. PURPOSE.
Consistent with the National Guidelines on Behavioral Crisis Intervention' and as
outlined in this Act, it is the intent of the [City Council, County Board of Commissioners,
State Legislature] to authorize the [City Manager's Office, County Commissioners'
Office, the State Department of Health] to develop and implement [local, county-wide,
regional] nonpolice administered crisis call center[s] (CCC[s]) and behavioral health
mobile crisis response teams (BHRTs) to respond to calls regarding crises that arise due
to mental health, substance use, or homelessness.
SECTION III. DEFINITIONS.
For the purposes of this Act, unless the context explicitly indicates otherwise, the
words and phrases listed below have the meanings given to them in this Section.
(a) Behavioral health consumer. "behavioral health consumer" means anyone
who has received mental health or substance use treatment services in the past, anyone
who has a mental health or substance use disorder diagnosis, or anyone who has
experienced a mental health or substance use disorder. A behavioral health consumer
should not be a peer specialist, as defined in this Act.
(b) Mental health disorder. "mental health disorder" means any mental illness,
not including substance use disorders, as diagnosed according to the 5th edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), or subsequent editions.
(c) Substance use disorder. "substance use disorder" means substance use
disorders as described in the DSM-5, or subsequent editions.
(d) Peer specialist. "peer specialist" means any individual certified or qualified as
a peer specialist or as a recovery specialist by the appropriate agency or organization.
(e) Treatment. "treatment" means the treatment for substance use disorder or
mental health disorder with a licensed or certified professional. This can include an
individualized assessment, diagnosis, counseling, the prescription of medication,
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recovery support services, hospitalization, non-hospital residential services, and
withdrawal management.
(f) Treatment provider. "treatment provider" means any substance use disorder or
mental health disorder treatment professional, facility, or program that is [licensed,
certified, approved] by [the state] to provide treatment.
(g) Emergency medical services personnel. "Emergency medical services
personnel" means individuals who are licensed or certified to provide ambulance or
paramedic services, including pre-hospital treatment, medical stabilization, and
transportation to more comprehensive care.
(h) Harm reduction services. "Harm reduction services" means public health
services designed to empower individuals to mitigate the potential harms of
risk-associated behaviors. Such services include, but are not limited to: distribution of
sterile syringes; distribution of other sterile injection equipment (tourniquets, alcohol
swabs, sterile water, sterile cottons, sterile cookers, etc.); distribution of naloxone and
training in overdose response; collection of used syringes and other biohazard waste;
rapid testing for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), Hepatitis C Virus, and other
infectious diseases; wound care; referral to social services; referral to healthcare services;
referral to treatment for substance use disorders; and other forms of mutual aid.
(i) Sexual minorities. "Sexual minorities" means individuals who identify as
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, nonheterosexual, nonbinary, third gender, or
intersex.
() Trained mental health crisis counselor. "Trained mental health crisis
counselor" is any mental health professional with experience or training in crisis
intervention theory and therapeutic practices.
SECTION IV. AUTHORIZATION.
(a) In general. The [City Manager's Office, County Commissioners' Office, the
State Department of Health] is directed to establish a CCC that is not administered or
staffed by law enforcement and a BHRT program subject to the provisions of this Act.
(b) The establishment of the CCC and BHRT program shall occur in partnership
with a consumer-led advisory board that is comprised of at least 510% behavioral health
consumers, persons who have experienced or are experiencing houselessness, members
of local immigrant communities, sexual minorities, persons with disabilities, and racial
or ethnic minorities (together, "Advisory Board"). If possible, at least one person from
each of the aforementioned populations should be selected. Members of the community
interested in serving on the Advisory Board should submit an application to the [City
Manager's Office or County Commissioners' Office]. [City Council Members or
Commissioners] will review the applications and appoint a minimum of seven (7)
applicants to the Advisory Board. Each Advisory Board member will serve a two-year
term. The Advisory Board will have the authority to carry out the responsibilities listed
in Section V and VII(b) of this Act.
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SECTION V. IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE.
(a) Within six (6) months of the effective date of this Act, the [City Manager's
Office, County Commissioners' Office, the State Department of Health] and Advisory
Board shall create a CCC and BHRT program plan ("program plan") that includes:
(i) protocols and procedures for establishing a designated nonpolice crisis
response phone number for the public to call;
(ii) procedures for call routing to BHRTs;
(iii) a plan to market the crisis phone number and CCC/BHRT program to the
community;
(iv) protocols and procedures for the BHRT;
(v) staffing requirements for CCC and BHRT; and
(vi) a standardized set of minimum data to be collected from the CCC and
BHRT program, including, but not limited to, demographic information on program
participants, the general nature of the calls received, and the services provided.
(b) The program plan must be approved by 51% of the Advisory Board and must
meet the requirements set forth in Section VI of this Act.
(c) Once in operation, the CCC and BHRT must report the data, as defined by
Section V(a)(vi), to the Advisory Board each quarter and shall make the data available
to the public.
SECTION VI. PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.
(a) The BHRT shall be the sole first responder to calls dispatched from the CCC
involving crises that do not require law enforcement response, including homelessness,
intoxication, disorientation, substance use, mental illness, and wellness checks.
(b) The BHRT shall provide immediate stabilization in case of urgent medical need
or psychological crisis, assessment, information, referrals, advocacy, and, if requested
by the affected individual, transportation to the next step in treatment.
(c) Each unique BHRT responding to calls will consist of at least three
members: (1) at least one emergency medical services personnel, (2) a trained mental
health crisis counselor, and (3) a behavioral health consumer.
(d) When responding to calls, the BHRT must carry overdose reversal medication.
(e) All services provided by CCC and BHRT must remain confidential and comply
with any state and federal statutes governing the confidentiality of health information,
including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L.
104-191, 100 Stat. 2548, and related rules and regulations. An individual in crisis shall
not be required to provide their name or identifying information in order to be served by
the CCC or BHRT.
(f) The BHRT must provide the individual in crisis with information on how to
access local harm reduction services, substance use treatment, mental health services,
housing assistance resources, healthcare services, and any other social services that the
BHRT deems appropriate.
(g) If an individual with a substance use crisis requests or agrees to be provided
with information on treatment options, the BHRT must provide the individual with
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information on how to access various types of treatment, including outpatient treatment
and medication for treatment of substance use disorders.
(h) In accordance with the U.S. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration's (SAMHSA) National Guidelines for Crisis Care, the BHRT will follow
the principle of least restrictive setting for follow-up care.
SECTION VII. FUNDING.
(a) In general. The [City Council, County Board of Commissioners, State
Legislature] may appropriate funds to [City Manager's Office, County Commissioners'
Office, the State Department of Health] for the purpose of funding services provided as
part of the CCC and BHRT program subject to Section IV of this Act ("Authorization").
(b) Guidelines and requirements. The [City Manager's Office, County
Commissioners' Office, the State Department of Health], with majority approval of the
Advisory Board, will set requirements for the distribution of funds for the expenses
related to the CCC and BHRT programs.
SECTION VIII. RULES AND REGULATIONS.
[State or local] agencies and officials shall promulgate rules and regulations
necessary to implement their responsibilities under this Act.
SECTION X. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this Act or application thereof to any individual or circumstance
is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the Act
that can be given effect without the invalid provisions or applications, and to this end,
the provisions of this Act are severable.
SECTION XI. EFFECTIVE DATE.
This Act shall be effective on

